Databases Reference
In-Depth Information
users access only to that subset of data they require to perform their jobs.
For example, a view of the EMPLOYEE table could be created and granted
to managers so that only the records of employees in the manager's depart-
ment can be accessed.
In the planning and design stages, the privileges to objects should be
defined for all user. To facilitate this process, common database privileges
can be grouped into roles. usually on the basis of shared job function.
Using roles eliminates the need to create and maintain individual privileges
for each user. In building applications, therefore, systems developers
should create previously identified roles, grant privileges to these roles,
and assign the roles to users who share related job duties.
As a final step, audit controls should be put into place, It is important to
audit only those areas essential for ensuring system security. Audit options
should be carefully selected to avoid performing superfluous audits that
might degrade system performance and to ensure that audit reports are as
concise as possible.
CONCLUSION
Security administration should be well supported by a relational database
product. The mechanisms used to manage users and database privileges
and the availability of roles and of other enhanced features should provide
sufficient flexibility to implement the organization's security policies.
Because today's computing environment changes rapidly, it is also
important for a product to be able to evolve to take advantage of emerging
technologies. The security challenges posed by recent developments in
client-server computing and distributed databases only dramatize the
need for database systems that can adapt to the computing environment
of the future.
Notes
1. Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, DOD 5200-28-STD, United States Depart-
ment of Defense, 1985; Trusted Database Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria. NCSC-TC-021, Version 1, United States National Computer Security
Center, 1991.
2. Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria, Version 1.2, Commission of the
European Communities. CD-71-91-502-EN-C, 1991.
3. R. Allen and B. Maimone, “Methods for Resolving the Security vs. Integrity Conflict,“
Proceedings of the Fourth RADC Database Security Workshop
(Little Compton, RI. April
1991).
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