THE WHITE VOLTA SUB-BASIN - Sustainable Irrigation Development in the White Volta Sub-Basin - page 35

the texts of the Réform Agraire et Fonciêre (RAF) of 1991) and the policy of
decentralization (de Zeeuw, 1997).
The Revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara enacted a very complex legal
code, bringing in a ‚modern‛ tenure system centred on ownership of
cultivated land by those who worked it. In its ‚revolutionary‛ logic, the
reform rejected any role for the customary authorities, which were regarded
as representing ‚feudalism‛. The reform law, which denied all customary
rights, was so complex that not even the local officials responsible for its
enforcement could understand it. Two successive versions followed (1991 and
1996), which allowed for private property and recognised existing customary
rights in undeveloped areas (although providing no legal safeguards to
support such claims). The government tolerates customary claims, so long as
they do not compromise the state's own development plans. Traditional
chiefs included in the consultation process for re-formulating the RAF have
successfully delayed the subsequent legal revisions of the legislation (Delville,
2000).
An overview of local systems shows the wide variety of situations on the
ground and the profound transformation that they have undergone.
Nevertheless, where customary tenure principles and local regulatory
mechanisms still prevail it is possible to point out some common features.
These include the fact that rules governing access to land and other natural
resources are an integral part of the social structure, that tenure is
inseparable from social relationships, and that the use of land confers certain
rights (Delville, 2000). These principles are implemented and arbitrated by
customary authorities, whose legitimacy usually derives from prior
occupancy (they are regarded as the descendants of the community founders)
and the magic/religious alliance with the local spirits, or from conquest
(Chauveau, 1998 cited in Delville, 2000). These authorities (the land chiefs)
then control the territory, exercising their political power to allocate land to
other lineage groups and carrying out the rites required for them to clear it
for cultivation (Bouju, 1998 cited in Delville, 2000). Families settled in this
way have control over the bush areas allocated to them, and these can
become family landholdings with transmissible cultivation rights (Delville,
2000).
The distribution of land rights is therefore based on the socio-political
system (the political history of the village and region from which the
alliances and hierarchical relationships between lineages are derived) and on
family relationships (access to land and resources depending on one's social
status within the family), so that social networks govern access rights (Berry,