ETHICS OF COLLABORATION - Collaborative Computational Technologies for Biomedical Research - page 125

as other information, shared responsibility for writing and publishing together,
and disclosure and settling of fi nancial interests [11]. Of course, Raza is describ-
ing the ideal colleague or, from a superior's perspective, an ideal subordinate.
The person or persons who have the traits and capabilities Raza enumerates
need to be present before collaborative work can be or should be
undertaken.
Another important ingredient of successful collaboration is confl ict resolu-
tion. In the real world, collaborations do not always go smoothly, sailing along
in a problem-free manner. Also, in the real world, a need for team leaders
exists or, minimally, third parties that would aid in dispute resolution. Raza
suggests that team leaders resolve disputes [11] and that they do so by talking
directly with each other. However, if some sort of agreement has not been
reached beforehand about how to resolve confl ict, it may not matter that team
leaders have the responsibility of settling disputes. Griesel makes many of the
same practical points as Raza.
Griesel ' s “ Guidelines for Ethics of Collaboration Checklist ” [3] also has
pragmatic suggestion. Griesel says potential collaborators ask these sorts of
questions [3]: “Do the guidelines promote the overall mission? Do the guide-
lines allow for a positive confl ict resolution plan? Are the guidelines for per-
sonal, professional, and public responsibility clearly stated? Do the guidelines
encourage freedom of choice? Do the guidelines allow for change and further
development? Do the guidelines encourage goodwill, cooperation, and respon-
sibility? Are the guidelines democratic?” Were a potential collaborator to ask
these questions, the likelihood of a successful collaboration would be enhanced.
In other words, despite the intentional goodwill, collaborations do fail.
One way that collaborations fail is by exclusion. The modern women's
movement has pointed out what would be a fatal fl aw for the notion that
scientifi c inquiry is a collaborative activity. Many feminist thinkers, particularly
Harding [12], have argued or implied that the activity of science excludes
women, can hardly be called inclusive, and, to that extent, is not collaborative
or cooperative at all. Harding suggests, for example, that feminists “would have
to reinvent both science and theorizing itself in order to make sense of women's
social experience” [13, p. 251].
At the heart of this sort of criticism is that science and the scientifi c com-
munity have not been collaborative inasmuch as they have not been demo-
cratic and open to all. While data may suggest otherwise, for instance, that by
2008-2009 women earned 60% of the doctorates in the social sciences, 70%
of the doctorates in the health sciences, and 51% of the doctorates in the
biological and agricultural sciences, as reported by Bell [14], the criticism
shows what could be a genuine problem for the ethics of collaboration, namely,
exclusion. Discounting an individual for a collaborative activity on the basis
of sex is simply wrong.
Regardless of the merits of the feminist arguments “against” science, the
feminist critiques do point to the necessity of stepping outside the scientifi c
community and appraising it for inclusion. The requirement demands an