Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
When = 0 it is the well-known Nash equilibrium [16]. In some cases, a Nash
equilibrium in the strict sense is hard to compute [3], while computing the -
approximate Nash equilibrium is much easier [4]. Therefore, the -Nash equilib-
rium is also an appealing notion for a small .
Definition 2. Astrategy σ induces an k-resilient -Nash equilibrium if for any
coalition
k ) and for any strategy profile σ C
C
of at most k players (i.e.
|C| ≤
of
the coalition
C
, it holds that
u i ( σ C
)
u i ( σ C
)+
for any i
∈C
,
C
C
where
C
denotes the complement of
C
.
When k = 1 it is the -Nash equilibrium just defined. In this work, we realize
the resilience for k = t
1ina t -out-of- n secret sharing scheme. Obviously, this
is the optimal coalition resilience in the t -out-of- n case.
2.3
Information-Theoretic MACs
We refer to [6] for the description of information theoretically secure message
authentication codes (MACs). A message authentication code consists of three
polynomial-time algorithms ( Gen , Mac , Vrfy ). The key-generation algorithm Gen
takes as input the security parameter 1 m and outputs a key k . The message au-
thentication algorithm Mac takes as input a key k and a message M
} ≤m ,
and outputs a tag t ; we write this as t = Mac k ( M ). The verification algorithm
Vrfy takes as input a key k , a message M and a tag t , and outputs a bit b ; i.e.,
b = Vrfy k ( M, t ). We regard b = 1 as acceptance and b = 0 as rejection, and
require that for all m ,all k output by Gen (1 m ), all M
∈{
0 , 1
} ≤m , it holds that
∈{
0 , 1
Vrfy k ( M, Mac k ( M )) = 1.
Definition 3. ( Gen , Mac , Vrfy ) is an information-theoretic MAC if for any M
} ≤m , k = Gen (1 m ) , t = Mac k ( M ) , and for any (computationally unbounded)
adversary
{
0 , 1
, the following probability is negligible in m :
μ ( m )= Prob [( M ,t ) ←A ( M, t ): Vrfy k ( M ,t )=1 M
A
= M ] .
For example, an information-theoretic MAC can be built as follows [17,19]: Let
F be a finite field, the key is ( α, β ) F
2 . For a message M ∈ F ,thetagis
generated as t = β
αM
F
.
3 Rational Secret Sharing: The 2-Out-of-2 Case
In this section we give a 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing protocol in standard
communication networks (i.e. point-to-point and non-simultaneous channel) and
with unconditional security. Denote the protocol by Π , we describe Π in terms
of Dealer's protocol and players' protocol separately. Actually, Dealer's protocol
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