Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
6Conluon
In this paper, we demonstrate our attack on randomizing the base address of
library, order of library functions, and entries in PLT and GOT with return-
oriented programming under the assumption that the attacker has a copy of the
vulnerable program for static analysis. Besides introducing this more general
attack and proposing improvements to return-oriented programming to make
the attack more effective, we also evaluate an attack mitigation technique previ-
ously proposed. Results show that dereferencing GOT is actually not a necessary
step in the attack, and therefore encrypting GOT does not make address space
randomization secure against return-oriented programming.
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