Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
Table 2. Storage requirements (in bytes) of our implementation on the sensor nodes.
In coupon mode, 21 B must be added per stored coupon.
Mode
Memory
MICAz
TelosB
Coupon
RAM
1067 (26%)
1071 (10%)
ROM
23764 (18%)
14470 (29%)
No Coupon
RAM
1699 (41%)
1739 (17%)
ROM
36576 (28%)
19164 (39%)
The original XSGS protocol would also consume a considerable amount of
memory. On the other hand, the memory usage of the cooperative protocol is
relatively modest (Table 2), even when the ECC point multiplication is per-
formed on the node. The tiny operating system already consumes a significant
fraction of the used memory (about 700 B RAM and a little more than 10 kB
ROM on both nodes). A coupon ( r z , r z . Rpk 1 ) requires normally 60 B, i.e. three
20-B field elements, but it can be reduced to a little more than 20 B using point
compression and a PRNG sequence for storing all the r z , as done in [20]. As
the coupons can be placed in RAM or ROM, their storage in both the MICAz
and TelosB is not a problem. Considering the available memory resources, the
MICAz and the TelosB could be filled with more than 5000 and 2500 coupons
respectively, which is more than practical for many applications.
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