Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
We argue that Pr[ F
F ]isequaltoPr[ F
F 1 ] in the real attack. To see this
does not issue a query for H 2 ( v 1 ,v 2 ), its view during
the simulation is identical to its view in the real attack (against a real challenger
and a real random oracle for H 2 ), because all responses to H 1 , H 2 queries and
the challenge are distributed as in the real attack. We also remark that if
observe that as long as
A
A
issues the query for H 2 ( v 1 ,v 2 ),
A
will distinguish the simulation from the real
attack by detecting the challenge is not a genuine one, however, this does not
affect the security reduction. Therefore, Pr[ F
F 1 ]
in the real attack. It follows by (4) and the inductive hypothesis that Pr[ F ]in
the real attack is equal to Pr[ F ] in the simulation. By induction on we obtain
that Pr[ F ]isequaltoPr[ F ] in the real attack.
F 1 ]isequaltoPr[ F
Claim 2: In the real attack we have Pr[ F ]
2 .
never issues a query for H 2 ( v 1 ,v 2 ) then the
decryption of C is independent of
Proof. In the real attack, if
A
's view (since H 2 ( v 1 ,v 2 ) is independent of
A
's view). Therefore, in the real attack Pr[ β = β
A
F ]=1 / 2. By definition of
Pr[ β = β ]
A
, we know that in the real attack
|
1 / 2
|≥
. We show that these
two facts imply that Pr[ F ]
2 . To do so we derive upper and lower bounds on
Pr[ β = β ]:
Pr[ β = β ]=Pr[ β = β
F ]+Pr[ β = β |
F ]Pr[
¬
F ]Pr[ F ]
F ]+Pr[ F ]= 1
F ]+Pr[ F ]= 1
2 + 1
Pr[ β = β
F ]Pr[
¬
2 Pr[
¬
2 Pr[ F ] ,
F ]= 1
1
2 Pr[ F ] .
Pr[ β = β ]
Pr[ β = β |
= F ]Pr[
¬
2
Pr[ β = β ]
1
It follows that
≤|
1 / 2
|≤
2 Pr[ F ]. Therefore, in the real attack
Pr[ F ]
2 .
To complete the proof we still have to bound the probability that
B
aborts during
the game. Throughout the simulation,
B
will abort the game for the following
two reasons:
issues the private query on ID , the probability of which is Q e /Q h 1 .
1.
A
does not choose ID as the challenge identity, the possibility of which is
2.
A
1
1 / ( Q h 1
Q e ).
So the probability that
B
does not abort during the simulation is
]= 1
=
Q e
Q h 1
1
Q h 1
1
Q h 1
Pr[
.
(5)
abort
Q e
Therefore the advantage of
B
against strong twin BDHI problem is
1
Q h 1
Adv-2BDHI B
Pr[ F
| abort
]Pr[
]=2
·
.
(6)
abort
 
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