Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
In any case, a hash function h must be applied to the original message,
and the hash is signed. Thus, Mallory would have to find a message m such
that h ( m )= m , which he has a very low probability of doing if h is strongly
collision-resistant. However, if step 1 of the verification stage is not enforced,
then Mallory can forge certain signatures of his own choosing if he has a previous
legitimate message signed by Alice, as demonstrated in the following.
Suppose that a previous legitimate signature by Alice for a message m is
( β,γ ). Furthermore, suppose that Mallory is lucky and m 1 (mod p
1) exists,
and Mallory chooses a message m 1 to forge. Mallory computes both congruences
t
m 1 m 1 (mod p
1). By the Chinese remainder
theorem, he can also compute a solution x = β 1 to the congruences:
1) and γ 1
(mod p
x
βt (mod p
1) and x
β (mod p ) .
Thus,
α m 1 mm 1
y β 1 β γ 1
1
α 1 β
α aβt α rtγ
α t ( + )
α tm
α m 1 (mod p ) .
Hence, ( β 1 1 ) is accepted as a valid signature by the verification stage for m 1 ,
if step 1 in that stage is ignored. The essential nature of step 1 in the verification
stage was first observed in [26].
The value r chosen by Alice in the signing stage has to be kept secret, or
there is a total break of the system since Mallory can get a from knowledge of r .
Since β,γ , and m are known, then knowledge of r means that he may compute
a
) β 1 (mod p
1).
Also, if Alice is careless and uses r for the signing of two different messages,
then Mallory can get r and break the system as above. Here is how he gets r .
If sig k ( m 1 ,r )=( β,γ 1 ) and sig k ( m 2 ,r )=( β,γ 2 ), then
y β β γ 1
( m
α + 1
α m 1 (mod p ) ,
and
y β β γ 2
α + 2
α m 2 (mod p ) .
Therefore,
α m 2 m 1
β γ 2 γ 1
α r ( γ 2 γ 1 ) (mod p ) .
Hence,
m 2
m 1
r ( γ 2
γ 1 ) (mod p
1) .
If gcd( p
1 2
γ 1 )= g , then
m 2
m 1
r ( γ 2
γ 1 )
(mod ( p
1) /g ) .
g
g
Thus,
m 2
γ 2
1
m 1
γ 1
r
(mod ( p
1) /g ) ,
g
g
since gcd(( γ 2
γ 1 ) /g, ( p
1) /g ) = 1, and once we have r we can get a as above.
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