Cryptography Reference
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3.1.3 Biases of Nested Permutation Entries to Secret Key
We have, so far, explained the biases of the elements S[y] toward the se-
cret key. The next natural question to ask is whether there exists any bias
if we consider accessing the elements of S by more than one level of index-
ing. The work [103] established that the entries S[S[y]] are indeed corre-
lated to the secret key for different values of y. As the KSA proceeds, the
probabilities P(S[y] = f y ) decrease monotonically, whereas the probabilities
P(S[S[y]] = f y ) first increases monotonically until the middle of the KSA and
then decreases monotonically until the end of the KSA.
Let us first discuss how P(S r [S r [1]] = f 1 ) varies with round r,1 ≤r ≤ N,
during the KSA of RC4. Refer to Figure 3.1 that demonstrates the nature of
the curve with an experimentation using 10 million randomly chosen secret
keys. The probability P(S r [S r [1]] = f 1 ) increases till around r =
N
2 where
it gets the maximum value around 0.185 and then it decreases to 0.136 at
r = N. On the other hand, as we saw in Theorem 3.1.5, P(S r [1] = f 1 )
decreases continuously as r increases during the KSA.
0.2
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
i −−−−>
FIGURE 3.1: P(S i+1 [S i+1 [1]] = f 1 ) versus i (r = i + 1) during RC4 KSA.
We first present theoretical analysis for the base case for r = 2, i.e., after
round 2 of the RC4 KSA.
Lemma 3.1.12. P(S 2 [S 2 [1]] = K[0] + K[1] + 1) =
3
N
N 2 +
2
N 3 .
Further, P(S 2 [S 2 [1]] = K[0] + K[1] + 1∧S 2 [1] ≤ 1) ≈ N .
Proof: The proof is based on three cases.
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