Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
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The creation of the Polio virus from scratch gives "textbook medicine" a new meaning. Although the
technology used to create a deadly virus could also be used to create new vaccines, a group with
access to a microbiology laboratory could create new, designer biological warfare agents that are far
more deadly than the Ebola virus. As such, making the sequence data on deadly pathogens freely
available on public databases, and even publishing the descriptions of basic microbiology techniques,
could be deemed a threat to national security.
This research highlights numerous ethical, political, and social issues that directly affect researchers
in the field of bioinformatics computing. For example, do the public biological databases amount to
publishing the plans for weapons, complete with instructions on how to synthesize the biological
payloads? Should a subset of biological data be off-limits to the public, non-U.S. laboratories, or
anyone without a demonstrable "need to know?" Should the publication of any type biological data on
known or potential biological warfare agents, such as
Figure 10-7
, be banned? What of the online
databases maintained by other countries, such as SWISS-PROT? Should collaboration be limited or
monitored by local governments, the WHO, or other organization?
An examination of the nuclear and computing industries and how threats have been addressed might
provide some guidance on how to address the issue of synthetic biologicals. When Britain's Ministry
of Defense recently made public the information describing in detail the make-up of a nuclear bomb,
there was highly publicized opposition from those who contend that the disclosure amounts to giving
potential terrorists a blueprint to create an atomic bomb. However, the Ministry of Defense countered
that the Web is replete with plans to make atomic bombs (a Google search for "atomic bomb plans"
in August of 2002 reveals 59,600 hits), and that the accusations were groundless. Others contend
that the real issue is controlling plutonium, not the plans for a bomb. Some rebuke this position by
highlighting the amount of weapons-grade plutonium that is "missing" from the dismantled Soviet
atomic arsenal.
Another view is that information on how to build an atomic bomb from the Ministry of Defense is
more likely to be believed by terrorists than are the plans posted anonymously on the Web.
Assuming extensive testing isn't performed on the resultant bomb, if one or two key elements of the
Ministry's plans are intentionally in error, then the terrorist's time, effort, and plutonium would be
wasted on a failed attempt at building and exploding an atomic bomb.
Following this scenario, is it acceptable, in the interest of national security, to post erroneous
information in the online biological databases? For example, should the sequence definition of
potential biohazards, such as the Polio virus sequence in
Figure 10-7
, contain intentional errors that
reduce the potency of the virus (the synthetic Polio virus created at State University of New York isn't
as infectious as the natural virus because of 18 genetic markers intentionally inserted into the virus)?
In addition, should the errors be used to indicate the source of the sequence data as well as render
the viruses harmless?
In the computing industry, the U.S. has a long-standing practice of barring the export of computers,
including desktop and laptop computers, capable of being used in weapons systems or in weapons
design. As a workaround, groups in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere have developed high-
performance computing clusters using Sony PlayStation II hardware, which is easy to purchase on