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Table 2.
An overview of the main model concepts of the ostracism model the related available
empirical data from the Bali context and some first ideas for the ABM of Bali irrigation
ABM
dimensions
Contextualised
ABM
Abstract model
Bali context
Emergent
pattern
level of
cooperation
Difference in ability to adapt to
social and environmental chal-
lenges
Assume 'adaptive
capacity' = level of
cooperation
Aggregated
variables
Resource
volume
f(constant)
Water availability (local)
f(upstreamOuttake,rainfall)
Water availability
Proportion of
Cooperators,
Defectors [%]
Number of cooperators
Number of
cooperators
OstracismCost
There is no empirical evidence for
farmers knowing the overall coop-
eration/defection ratio (social
capital) or the relative difference
in size of defection.
OstracismCost =
F(coopRatio,
inequityEffect
6
)
The age and demographic stability
of the subak are indicators for
effective sanctioning.
Agent
Behaviour op-
tions {Coope-
rate, Defect}
Behaviours
- Take out X water to farm land on
time t
- Perform rituals
- Maintain canals
- Perform Agricultural labour
- Attend weekly subak meetings
- other
Decision-
making: imitate
if other has a
better strategy
This is a theoretical assumption of
human decision-making.
No empirical evidence about the
imitating when others perform
better.
6
The bigger the difference between the defector and cooperator payoff, the bigger the ostracism.
Can be regarded as another type of gradual sanctioning: small offence, small punishment.
Large offence, big punishment. In addition to the standard description of gradual sanctioning
that describes an increase in punishment over time when the defection is repeated.
