Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
(a)
(b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2.
If agent
A
1
is a
ToM
0
allocator as in Example 1, he is unable to consider the
goals of responder
R
when making a trade offer. Instead, he offers to make a trade that
would maximize his own score.
(a) Initial situation
(b) Preferred outcome of agent
A
2
(c) Beneficial trade for both agents (d) E
cient beneficial trade
Fig. 3.
If agent
A
2
is a
ToM
1
allocator as in Example 2, he considers both his own
goals, as well as the goals of the responder
R
and competing allocator
A
1
(b) Higher payoff for
R
Fig. 4.
If agent
A
1
is a
ToM
2
allocator as in Example 3, he believes that agent
A
2
also
considers the responder's goals when making an offer to her. In this case, the
ToM
2
allocator
A
1
chooses between two alternatives.
(a) Higher payoff for
A
1