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for comparable contributions” (p. 57). Merton concludes that, regardless of the true
merit of a scientist's work, the reputation of a scientist, determined largely by track
record, influences publication prospects and subsequent enhancement of reputation,
leading to what Merton termed the
Matthew Effect
: The rich get richer and leave the
poor behind.
Consistent with the Matthew Effect, a number of studies have found a positive
correlation between the reputation of an institute and the productivity of its members,
measured by the number of manuscripts they published and the number of citations
their publications received (e.g., see Howard, Cole & Maxwell 1987; Morgan, Meier,
Kearney, Hays & Birch, 1981). Other studies showed that an author's total number of
publications, citations, and scientific achievements affect, and are affected by, the
author's reputation or previous scientific achievements (e.g., see Bourne & Barbour
2011; Bornmann & Daniel, 2007; Dewett & Denisi 2004; Ferber 1986). Day & Peters
(1994) found that academic journals with new and fresh ideas were referenced as long
as the journals had an article by a renowned author. Ofori-Dankwa & Julian (2005)
reported that adoption of a new theory depends, in part, on the reputation of the author
of the theory and author's university affiliation.
Computer simulations of resource allocations have demonstrated a surprisingly
large influence of resource scarcity, allocation rules, and chance on the distribution of
limited resources, including grants and publications. Thorngate, Hotta and
McClintock (1996), for example, showed that early winners in Bingo games were far
more likely to survive future games than were early losers simply because their early
winnings allowed them to remain longer in the game. The results suggest that lucky
authors who establish a good reputation early in their career and are more likely to
continue their career than unlucky ones. Squazzoni and Gandelli (2012) showed that
the reliability of reviewer's manuscript assessments resource allocation rules strongly
influence competitions for journal space. Thorngate, Dawes and Foddy (2009) further
demonstrated that the outcomes of competitions for research grants are strongly
influenced by resource scarcity and chance, especially when the competitions are
repeated and the results of previous competitions are used in choosing current
winners. The present study attempted to investigate the influences of resource
scarcity, selection rules, and chance on the outcomes of competitions for limited
journal space.
Most scientists know that many scientific manuscripts eligible for publication in
scientific journals are nevertheless rejected. Resources are scarce and not everyone
can be accommodated. The American Psychological Association, for example, reports
publishing 28 journals in 2011 (APA, 2011). During that year the journal editors
collectively received 11,635 manuscript and rejected 77% of them, in part because
there was no more money to pay for additional journal pages.
The scarcity of pages forces editors to devise procedures for deciding which
manuscripts will be printed and which won't. A few of these procedures are common
(Thorngate, Dawes & Foddy, 2009). Almost all editors, for example, quickly scan
manuscripts for the eligibility of their content, culling manuscripts with content far
removed from the journal's themes, likely fictitious, or clearly lacking in scientific
rigour. Manuscripts surviving the eligibility cull are then distributed to 2-3 peers for
review, usually with prescriptions about what the reviewers should look for and how they
should indicate their assessments. Prescribed indicators include category selections (for
example, “publish without revisions, publish after minor revisions, ...reconsider after
