Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
preference weight of social conformity increases, the proportion of altruists required
for achieving high levels of the PG increases: In the first diagram of Fig. 2 high levels
of the PG are provided for populations with at least 40% of altruistic agents. Likewise,
in the second diagram more than 50% of altruists are required. Apparently, social
coherence effects inhibit mobilisation due to a lock-in of passive behaviour with in-
creasing preference for social conformity and with decreasing proportion of altruists.
Especially for the highest preference for social conformity we observe that altruists
show investment behaviours that obviously contradict their social orientations: For the
social conformity preference 0.2, if the size of the altruistic subpopulation does not
exceed 30% of the population, altruists contribute less than 0.15. Yet, such behaviour
yields high social conformity in a predominantly egoistic population which apparently
overrides individual social orientations during agent decision-making.
Finally, it may be seen that the inequality of behaviours between altruists and ego-
ists decreases when preference for social conformity increases. As a result, altruists
tend to contribute less and egoists tend to contribute more with increasing social con-
formity preference. Clearly, when the preference for social conformity gains impor-
tance during agent decision-making, the topology of the social network increasingly
influences investment behaviours. Therefore, prevalent behaviours of the respective
other subpopulation contribute more to an individual's social conformity perception
and in turn trigger a process of inter-population social adjustment.
5
Synthesis of Results and Conclusions
The focus of the HAPPenInGS theory is the micro-level of decision-making in public
good dilemmas. The purpose of HAPPenInGS-A is to supplement the bottom-up
macro-level perspective on public good provision by applying methods of ABSS. In
doing so, HAPPenInGS-A represents processes of social influence, temporal dynamics,
and collectives of agents each behaviourally grounded in HAPPenInGS. The key ques-
tion of this paper was on the interrelation of individual-level preferences and macro-
level outcomes. We tackled the question by exploring the range of implications of the
HAPPenInGS theory through a series of simulation exercises. In particular we per-
formed a dynamical analysis of the interplay of social conformity preferences and
social orientations on the individual level, and the macro-level consequences.
Some results mainly confirmed expectations and therefore demonstrated the consis-
tency of HAPPenInGS: For instance, high preferences for social conformity might
prevent social mobilisation even in predominantly altruistic populations. On the other
hand it could be shown that medium social conformity preferences foster social mobi-
lisation and in addition decrease inequalities of contributions on the individual level. In
addition to the general plausibility of such results, they demonstrate the emergent com-
plexity which arises from a simple and abstract theory like HAPPenInGS in the context
of an ABSS exercise. Other results of the analysis of HAPPenInGS-A were less intui-
tive: For example the assessment of the temporal dimension of social mobilisation
showed that if agents strive for social conformity in addition to following altruistic
preferences, the speed of social mobilisation is reduced. Clearly, the underlying
