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percentage of guilt averse agents that is necessary for sustaining cooperation. Secondly,
in the present model, an agents' learning algorithm is specific for every agent with
whom they have interacted; that is, there is no 'global' learning, in the sense of an
intuition of the global trend to cooperate or to defect of the rest of the population. Fur-
thermore, it would also be interesting to analyze the results for a case-scenario were the
degree of guilt aversion of the agents is perceivable by their opponents (cf. [13]).
Acknowledgement.
This work is part of the EmoTES ("Emotions in strategic inter-
action : theory, experiments, logical and computational studies") research project. The
EmoTES project is funded by the French National Research Agency (ANR).
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