CHINA’S WILD WEST - Wildlife Conservation in China: Preserving the Habitat of China's Wild West - page 51

Figure 2.9 A conceptual diagram of the relationships among mean precipitation during
the growing season (or vegetation productivity), clarity of whatever land tenure
system is in place, and likelihood of chronic rangeland degradation. This simple
model makes no assumption about the type of economy prevailing in the area,
but regardless of whether it is primarily subsistence, market-based, or some
intermediate, takes it as a constant.

Least
likely

Most
likely

Intermediate

In summary then, current land tenure policy uses an awkward mixture of reliance
on market forces on the one hand, and command-control regulation on the other. The
basic model states that herders are supposed to be guided by market forces; indeed, the
ecological-economic rationale for the “set of four” program is that it increases the indi-
vidual responsibility-benefit loop by more clearly demarcating and enhancing the value
of each individual's “property.” Carrying-capacity limits exist on paper only and are not
enforced; thus, stocking levels are also determined solely by the herder on the basis of
his own economic calculations.
But existing side-by-side with this are government programs that (1) subsidize seden-
tarization and production of supplemental fodder; (2) govern the proportion of herds kept
in sheep, goats, and yaks (and in some localities, promote specific breeds of livestock);
(3) encourage specific models of production; (4) mandate the timing of seasonal herd
movements; and (5) in extreme cases, remove pastoralists entirely in exchange for a
subsidized town life. Thus, the sense of personal responsibility that underlies the ability
of the contract systems and “set of four” to work toward grassland restoration may still
be weak among western Chinese pastoralists. By initiating a continuous stream of new