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capita
price, rather than the
per weight
price, that matters biologically. Prices for musk
and rhino horn, while varying considerably depending on source, quality, and position
within the trading system, are both exorbitant, ranging from as low as $8,000 per kilo-
gram to as much as $60,000 per kilogram. But it takes roughly forty adult male musk
deer to produce a kilogram of musk, whereas a single rhino horn may weigh 3 to 10
kilograms (depending on species, age, and sex). Thus, even if musk and rhino horn are
priced identically per weight, an individual rhino returns a far more lucrative sum to the
would-be poacher than does an individual musk deer (individual rhino horns have been
cited as selling for between $25,000 and as much as $200,000, whereas raw musk pod
prices have been documented as being worth roughly $100 to $250).
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Thus, for rhinos,
the economic incentives of continuing to harvest are so high (i.e., poachers would always
assess the risks of apprehension and punishment as worth taking), that control over harvest
levels would be extremely difficult. The similar “value” of rhino horn and musk should
not be allowed to cloud the very different economics and biology underpinning possible
conservation strategies. Sustainable use of musk deer has never been done, but remains
logically plausible. But for rhinos, sustainable use based on legal trade is a contradiction
in terms.
I wish to reemphasize that I am not recommending a wildlife conservation system based
solely on market-exchange mechanisms. I concur with those who have pointed out the
ubiquity of market failures (e.g., legal hunting of musk deer in Russia has evidently not
prevented widespread poaching and some population declines
14
). Particularly in China,
with its history of disconnect between value and price, and its raw and unsophisticated
version of market economics, it would be folly to blithely assume that Adam Smith's
“invisible hand” is capable of producing effective conservation where governments have
failed. Indeed, a fully market-based strategy is impossible in China if for no other reason
than that there is no free market in land. Although usufruct rates are specified for collec-
tives and individuals, all land ultimately belongs to the state; none is privately owned.
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But it remains true that economic incentives accruing to individuals can be tremendously
helpful in moving conservation forward. Monetary benefits from consumption, coupled
with local-level institutions to ensure sustainability and equitability, could help move
wildlife conservation in western China out of its current dilemma.
Further, the economic incentives that underlie my suggested schemes are secondary
to the cultural ones. What is at stake, it seems to me, is a sense of the wild. True, that
means limiting to a large degree mankind's intrusions. But to alienate mankind from
the wild entirely—as I argue current Chinese policy does—is not only contrary to the
predilections of most Chinese (as well as non-Han ethnic groups), but—in combina-
tion with rapid modernization—is more likely to result in wildland conversion than
wildland conservation. It might seem paradoxical that I am suggesting so much killing
as an avenue toward wildlife conservation. But it's not the killing that is important as
much as the involvement of local people that such killing requires. Lacking that, the
hands-off approach favored by current policy leads to alienation from, and ultimately
apathy toward, wildlife.
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