Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
CHINESE HUNTING AREAS AS CONSERVATION PROGRAMS
Viewed broadly, hunting programs can be categorized in one of two ways: as essentially
wildlife conservation programs, in which funds from hunters are used to either partially
or entirely offset the costs of running them; or, as essentially business enterprises, where
an otherwise rare species exists locally in sufficient abundance to justify a generation
of employment and profits. The two are not without overlapping aspects, of course.
Under the first concept, a profitable and sustainable business enterprise is a necessary
condition; under the second, the business ultimately fails if the animal population is
not adequately conserved. However, the two differ in fundamental conception and in
the desired incentive structure. Under the first, Chinese staff are wildlife managers who
also offer hunting services. Under the second, Chinese staff are travel agents and guides,
who hope that as the outcome of their business activities, wildlife will automatically
be well managed.
Chinese international hunting areas are currently business enterprises, not wildlife con-
servation programs, fundamentally because allocation of power and benefits is inversely
correlated to the level of responsibility. Rather than the majority of power and benefits
being held at the most local level (i.e., that closest to the animals and their habitat), they
are held at the national level. Those with the most ability to affect populations and habitat
are provided with the fewest tools. With the administrative structure upside-down, benefits
and responsibilities are inverted. As a result, the link between the business success and
conservation success is seriously weakened, and conservation is not assured.
Current Chinese policy looks toward market forces to assist in conservation. Hunt-
ing areas are treated and expected to operate much like a profit-making business. Under
this theory, they will prosper if they succeed in their fundamental objective of providing
high-quality hunts. This, in turn, necessitates conservation of wildlife populations. The
longed-for incentive structure links success of the quasi-business enterprise directly to
the health of the population that requires conservation action. This approach is reasonable
given the existing political, economic, and historical constraints.
The critical flaw is that international hunting areas are controlled and limited by
higher government authorities in ways that would never apply to a business enterprise
operating in a free-market economy. Because they have no authority to market or sell
hunts (hunters are assigned by provincial hunting companies), they have no guarantee
of seeing their conservation efforts rewarded with more business. But nor do hunting
areas have authority to limit the number of hunters arriving. They are thus denied the
ability to curtail harvesting in the short-term in order to assure sustainable offtake in the
long-term (even if that turns out to be a prudent free-market strategy). Further, hunting
areas are not in direct control of the receipts from the services they provide, thus denying
them the power to budget, or to allocate resources in a way to assure their own success.
Finally and most importantly, hunting areas have no control or influence on the quantity
or quality of habitat that forms the basis of their wildlife populations. If the product of
their “business enterprise” is high-quality hunts, they have no control over the means of
production (i.e., wildlife habitat).
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