Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
used species as off limits to citizens, and equating them with truly rare species for which
consumptive use cannot be justified, it prevents the future development and implementa-
tion of effective mechanisms to regulate consumptive use.
To this point in the document, the 1988 Law is focused entirely on protecting individual
animals from direct killing and is silent about habitat needed for wildlife to survive. That
changes beginning with Article 10, which advises forestry bureaus
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to delineate nature
reserves in areas where key species “live and breed.” But neither the authority nor the
encouragement to establish new nature reserves specifically to provide habitat for vulner-
able wildlife was new with the 1988 Law. A measure promulgated by the State Council in
1985 had already sanctioned nature reserves established and managed by forestry bureaus
as important for wildlife conservation, and by 1988, hundreds of reserves already existed
(well ahead of publication of specific regulations for their establishment and manage-
ment). Rather, its inclusion within the 1988 Law served the purpose of indicating that
nature reserves are to act as the principal places where wildlife species, protected by the
State or not, will have their habitat needs considered.
Articles 11 and 12 appear designed to limit habitat degradation, at least for listed key
species. These two articles seemingly invite consideration of wildlife habitat directly into
any and all land-use that potentially impacts wildlife regardless of where such impact
may occur. Article 11 calls not only for monitoring of potential adverse environmental
impacts on wildlife, but for relevant bureaus to “deal with” such impacts.
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Article 12 calls
not only for those wishing to engage in development activity with potential to harm key
species to write an “environmental report,” but for Environmental Protection agencies at
the relevant governmental-level to not approve such development projects without first
obtaining the concurrence of their parallel bureau dealing with wildlife. These simple
declarations appear superficially similar to one of the principal means by which wildlife
habitat is considered on federal land in the United States, where wildlife is only one of
numerous considerations.
But any such interpretation of Articles 11 and 12 would reflect the naiveté Donald
Clarke warned against: here we have aspirational law in all its glory. Their vague and brief
language gives no clue how such treatment of conflicts or approval of such developments
is to occur. Provincial wildlife offices lack personnel and budget to “deal with” such
habitat conflicts even if other interests are willing to consider them. More fundamentally,
wildlife offices have no authority to enforce mitigations for wildlife and no additional
source of power that might assist them in advocating for wildlife habitat. As Clarke has
reminded us, the issues here are not what the letter of the law says, but rather which set
of actors, in practice, is empowered to advance the agenda they represent.
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I know of
not a single case in which either Article 11 or 12 has been invoked. They are symbols,
providing soothing language to assure the reader that the central government understands
that wildlife habitat can be affected by human activity. But in context and in light of
implementation, wildlife habitat is relegated solely to nature reserves.
Similar aspirational sentiments are found in Article 14, in which the State acknowledges
that damage can be a two-way street: wildlife cannot only be damaged by humans, but
can also be a damaging force in its own right, producing “agricultural or other losses,”
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