Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
. In November 2004, a bug in the vote-counting software in DRE voting machines
in Guilford County, North Carolina, caused the systems to begin counting back-
ward after they reached a maximum count of 32,767. After the problem was fixed,
a recount changed the outcome of two races and gave another 22,000 votes to pres-
idential candidate John Kerry [40].
. In 2006 some Florida voters had a hard time voting for Democratic candidates on
DRE voting machines. After choosing Democrats, these voters discovered that the
machine's summary screen replaced some of the Democrats with their Republican
opponents. Some voters had to repeat their votes several times in order for the
proper candidate's name to appear on the summary screen [41].
. In a congressional election held in November 2006 in Florida, more than 18,000
votes cast on DRE voting machines were not recorded. The final tally showed Re-
publican Vern Buchanan beating Democrat Christine Jennings by only 369 votes
[42].
Some computer experts are worried about the vulnerability of electronic voting
machines to tampering. Finnish security specialist Harri Hursti investigated the memory
cartridges used to record votes in Diebold DRE voting machines. (After the polls close,
these cartridges are removed from the machines and taken to a central location, where
the votes are tallied.) Hursti discovered that he could use a readily available agricultural
scanning device to change the vote counts without leaving a trace [43].
Computer science professor Herbert Thompson examined the centralized Diebold
machine that tallies the votes from the individual DRE voting machines. According to
Thompson, the system lacked even a rudimentary authentication mechanism; he was
able to access the system's program without a login name or password. By inserting just
five lines of code, he successfully switched 5,000 votes from one candidate to another. “I
am positive an eighth grader could do this,” he said [43].
Without access to the source code to touch-screen systems, there is no way to test
how secure they are. The manufacturers of these systems have refused to make the
software public, saying the source code is valuable intellectual property—a trade secret.
The Open Voting Consortium has criticized the corporate control of elections in the
United States and advocates the development of open-source software to make elections
“open and transparent” [44].
Critics of touch-screen voting systems say these systems make possible an unprece-
dented level of election fraud. The old, lever-style mechanical voting machines were
susceptible to fraud at the local level. A voting official could enter a voting booth and
vote multiple times for a slate of candidates, but the number of extra votes that could be
added in any precinct without attracting attention was limited. In contrast, by chang-
ing the programming of an electronic voting system, a single person could change votes
across thousands of precincts [45].
Supporters of touch-screen voting machines say criticisms of DRE voting machines
are overblown. A report by the Pacific Research Institute maintains that DRE voting
systems are more secure than traditional paper ballots, which can be tampered with by
elections officials. “Open source advocates and paper trail champions want to steer e-
 
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