Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
Beginning at 9:35 A.M., Mizuho started to buy back shares of J-Com, but it was
only able to purchase about a half million shares. More than 96,000 shares had already
been purchased by other parties. It was impossible for Mizuho to provide shares to
these buyers because J-Com only had 14,500 publicly traded shares. Under the terms
of a special arrangement brokered by the stock exchange, Mizuho settled these accounts
by paying 912,000 yen per share to the buyers. In all, Mizuho Securities lost 40 billion
yen ($225 million) buying back shares. When the Tokyo Stock Exchange refused to
compensate Mizuho Securities for the loss, Mizuho Securities sued the Tokyo Stock
Exchange for $416 million. A court ruled in favor of Mizuho Securities but reduced the
compensation from the Tokyo Stock Exchange to $107 million because it was the error
of a Mizuho Securities employee that caused the problem in the first place [32].
Eventually the Tokyo Stock Exchange identified the bug that prevented the order
from being canceled. The bug had gone undetected for five years because it only occurred
when seven different unusual conditions all happened simultaneously [33].
Nearly two million ballots were not counted in the 2000 US presidential election because
they registered either no choice or multiple choices. The incredibly close election in
Florida was marred by the “hanging chad” and “butterfly ballot” controversies discussed
in Section 7.5. To avoid a repeat of these problems, Congress passed, and President
Bush signed, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA provided money to
states to replace punch-card voting systems and improve standards for administering
elections [34].
Many states used HAVA funds to purchase direct recording electronic (DRE) voting
machines. DRE voting machines allow voters to indicate each of their choices by touch-
ing the screen or pressing a button (Figure 8.4). After all selections have been made, a
summary screen displays the voter's choices. At this point, the voter may either cast the
ballot or back up to make changes.
Brazil and India have run national elections using DRE voting machines exclusively
[35]. In the United States, a variety of voting technologies are still being used; dur-
ing the November 2006 general election, about one-third of voters cast their ballots on
DRE systems. Proponents of DRE voting machines point out the speed and accuracy of
machine counting. They say the systems are more tamper-resistant than paper ballots,
which can be marked by election workers. When the ballots are electronic, it is impos-
sible for precincts to run out of ballots if turnout is higher than expected. In addition,
touch-screen voting machines can be programmed to help voters avoid the previously
mentioned errors of not choosing a candidate or selecting too many candidates [36].
Some computer experts have spoken out against the conversion to touch-screen
voting machines, arguing that they are not necessarily any better than the systems they
are replacing. In particular, experts worry about programming errors and the lack of a
paper audit trail
: a record of the original ballots cast.
Quite a few voting irregularities have been linked to DRE voting machines since
2002. Here is a selection.
