Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
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Workers painted over electric eyes or knocked photo sensors out of alignment.
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Light luggage was thrown off rapidly moving carts.
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Luggage was shredded by automated baggage handlers.
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The design did not consider the problem of fairly balancing the number of available
carts among all the locations needing them.
BAE attempted to solve these problems one at a time by trial and error, but the
system was too complicated to yield to this problem-solving approach. BAE should have
been looking at the big picture, trying to find where the specifications for the system
were wrong or unattainable.
DIA was supposed to open on October 31, 1993. The opening was delayed re-
peatedly because the baggage-handling system was not yet operational. Eventually, the
mayor of Denver announced the city would spend $50 million to build a conventional
luggage-handling system using tugs and carts. (This conventional system actually ended
up costing $71 million.) On February 28, 1995, flights to and from the new airport be-
gan. However, concourse A was not open at all. Concourse C opened with 11 airlines
using a traditional baggage system. The BAE automated system, far over budget at $311
million, was used only by United Airlines in concourse B to handle outgoing baggage
originating in Denver. United used a traditional system for the rest of its baggage in con-
course B.
The failure of BAE to deliver a working system on time resulted in a 16-month delay
in the opening of DIA. This delay cost Denver $1 million
aday
in interest on bonds and
operating costs. As a result, DIA began charging all the airlines a flight fee of about $20
per passenger, the highest airport fee in the nation. Airlines passed along this cost to
consumers by raising ticket prices of flights going through Denver [31].
While the story of the Denver International Airport is noteworthy because of the
large amount of money involved, it is not unusual for software projects to take longer
than expected and to cost more than anticipated. In fact, most software projects are not
completed on time and on budget. We explore this issue in greater detail in Section 8.7.
December 8, 2005, was the first day that shares of J-Com, a recruiting company, were
made available to the public on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. That morning, an employee
of Mizuho Securities received a call from a customer who said he wished to sell one share
of J-Com stock at a price of 610,000 yen. At 9:27 A.M., the Mizuho Securities employee
mistakenly entered an order to sell 610,000 shares of J-Com at 1 yen per share. When the
computer screen displayed a “Beyond price limit” warning, the employee overrode the
warning by hitting the Enter key twice, sending the order to the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
At 9:28 A.M., the sell order appeared on the Tokyo Stock Exchange's display board.
Spotting the mistake, Mizuho Securities attempted to cancel the sell order several times
between 9:29 and 9:35 A.M., but these attempts failed because of a bug in the Tokyo Stock
Exchange trading program. Mizuho also phoned the Tokyo Stock Exchange, asking the
TSE to cancel the sell order, but the Tokyo Stock Exchange refused.
