Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
I hit Jones on the head with a brick, I have not let him alone, but it is not his right of
privacy I have violated—it is his right to be secure in his own person.
Thomson argues that whenever the right to privacy is violated, another right is
violated as well. For example, suppose a man owns a pornographic picture. He doesn't
want anyone else to know he owns it, so he keeps it in a wall safe. He only takes it out of
his safe when he has taken pains to prevent others from looking into his home. Suppose
we use an X-ray machine to look into his home safe and view the picture. We have
violated his privacy, but we have also violated one of his property rights—the right to
decide who (if anybody) sees the picture.
Here is another example. Suppose a Saudi Arabian woman wishes to keep her face
covered for religious reasons. When she goes out in public, she puts a veil over her face.
If I should walk up and pull away her veil to see her face, I have violated her privacy. But
I have also violated one of her rights over her person—to decide who should touch her.
According to Thomson, there are a cluster of rights associated with privacy, just as
there are a cluster of rights associated with property and a cluster of rights associated
with our physical self. In Thomson's view, every violation of a privacy right is also a
violation of a right in some other cluster. Since this is the case, there is no need to define
privacy precisely or to decide exactly where to draw the line between violations of privacy
and acceptable conduct.
AUTONOMOUS MORAL AGENTS NEED SOME PRIVACY
Thomson is not alone in disputing that privacy is a natural right. Many philosophers
think privacy principles should be based on the more fundamental principle that each
person is worthy of respect [9]. We give each other privacy because we recognize privacy
is needed if people are to be autonomous moral agents able to develop healthy personal
relationships and act as free citizens in a democratic society.
Jeffrey Reiman supports this view:
The right to privacy protects the individual's interest in becoming, being, and re-
maining a person. It is thus a right which
all
human individuals possess—even
those in solitary confinement. It does not assert a right never to be seen even on
a crowded street. It is sufficient that I can control whether and by whom my body is
experienced in some significant places and that I have the real possibility of repair-
ing to those places. It is a right which protects my capacity to enter into intimate
relations, not because it protects my reserve of generally withheld information,
but because it enables me to make the commitment that underlies caring as
my
commitment uniquely conveyed by
my
thoughts and witnessed by
my
actions. [8,
p. 314]
Note Reiman's fairly restricted view of privacy. He carefully points out areas where
privacy is necessary. He does not argue that privacy is a natural right, nor does he suggest
that a person has complete control over what is held private.
CONCLUSION: PRIVACY IS A PRUDENTIAL RIGHT
