Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
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15.
op. cit.
L utkenhaus, (ref. [3]). The effect on the viability of throughput rates
caused by changing the number of subtraction bits associated with replacing
the average bound with the pointwise bound is not analyzed in Ref. [3], and the
tradeoffs between the security parameters that define the pointwise bound are
not numerically studied. Also, the complete loss of cryptographic security that
is caused by naive application of the result given in Ref. [12] is not presented
in Ref. [3].
16. The difference between the two throughput values is about 50 bits per second,
because an additional 30 bits are subtracted per processing block, and in the
example presented there are about 1.6 blocks per second. See Ref. [7] for a
discussion of processing block size.
