Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
institutions. A science of group cognition would flesh out the concept of struc-
turation, demonstrating with detailed analyses of empirical data how group inter-
actions can mediate between individual behavior and social practices (Stahl, 2009,
chap. 11).
The Construct of Group Cognition
The term
group cognition
does not signify an object or phenomenon to analyze like
brain functions or social institutions (Stahl, 2004a). It is a proposal for a new science
or focus within the human sciences. It hypothesizes
When small groups engage in cooperative problem solving or collaborative knowledge
building, there are distinctive processes of interest at the individual, small-group and com-
munity levels of analysis, which interact strongly with each other. The science of group
cognition is the study of the processes at the small-group level.
The science of group cognition is a human science, not a predictive science like
chemistry nor a predominantly quantitative one like physics. It deals with human
meanings in unique situations, necessarily relying upon interpretive case studies
and descriptions of inter-personal processes.
Processes at the small-group level are not necessarily reducible to processes
of individual minds nor do they imply the existence of some sort of group mind.
Rather, they may take place through the weaving of semantic and indexical refer-
ences within a group discourse. The indexical field (Hanks, 1992) or joint problem
space (Teasley & Roschelle, 1993) co-constructed through the sequential interaction
of a group ( Çakır, Zemel & Stahl, 2009) has the requisite complexity to consti-
tute an irreducible cognitive act in its own right. Cognitive science broadened the
definition of “cognition” beyond an activity of human minds in order to include
artificial intelligence of computers. What counts as cognitive is now a matter of
computational complexity. Anything that can compute well enough to play chess or
prove theorems can be a cognitive agent—whether they are a person, computer or
collaborative small group (Stahl, 2005).
Largely because of its linguistic form, the phrase “group cognition” is often taken
to refer to some kind of physical or mental object. But it is a theoretical construct,
not an object, as indicated by the hypothesis stated above. Commonsensical folk
theories assume that we generally talk about physical objects. However, if one looks
closely, most sciences deal with hypothesized entities, not physical objects; mental
representations are a prime example at the individual level and cultural norms or
social rules at the community level.
The group that engages in group cognition is not necessarily a set of physical
people who interact together in the present moment. For example, group processes
of problem solving, meaning making and knowledge building can be found in com-
puter logs of chat or threaded discussion, where the people who contributed are now
long gone. The interaction is captured and remains in the log. The interaction is not
like physical interaction but can bring together references from the distant past or
