Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
both Venter and Koh (2012) and Corbera
(2012), as cited. Co-investment may well
have to start with the clarification of use
rights and negotiation of agreements for
land use in high C stock parts of the land-
scape (Akiefnawati
et al
., 2010). Co-invest-
ment will also have to rely on clear local
roles in monitoring, rather than full reliance
on technical remote sensing approaches
(Danielsen
et al
., 2013).
Meanwhile, the response of private sec-
tor entities to critique and footprint con-
cerns of their end-consumers has led to the
emergence of paradigm (ib), where ES issues
are linked to existing commodity trade, rather
than being commoditized separately. So far,
the voluntary restriction of further peatland
conversion, in the face of public concerns,
probably has been the major 'market-based'
reduction of net soil carbon emissions.
It follows a pathway different from what is
usually considered, and has a strong focus
on recognized hotspots rather than support-
ing the large number of smallholders who
might make small per hectare gains in car-
bon stocks on small landholdings, subject to
expensive monitoring.
commitments to reduce overall CO
2
emis-
sions to incentives at the level of land users
to increase net C storage. If these incentives
are based on offset principles, however, they
only reduce net anthropogenic emissions if
they lead to stronger emission reduction tar-
gets at the negotiation tables for an agreed
cap overall.
Uncertainty in performance measures at
the national scale differs essentially from
that at the plot, farm or landscape level. Clear
effects in national accounts derive from the
aggregation of data with substantial spatial
variation in which inherent soil properties
and management-dependent soil carbon are
not separated as easily as directly visible
aboveground C stocks in vegetation. The
chances for effective market-based mechan-
isms to provide farm-level incentives for
increasing soil C stocks are limited by:
(i) unclear additionality at both the supply
and demand level; (ii) lack of adequate
international commitments to reduce C emis-
sions to the atmosphere; (iii) technical issues
of monitoring at high spatial resolution; and
(iv) lack of agreement on modalities for dir-
ect incentives and timescales for assessing
performance. Currently, and in the foresee-
able future, the main market-based mechan-
isms for avoiding land degradation and
enhancing soil C storage in low C emission
economies are the use of minimum stand-
ards for the sustainability of production
systems. This approach would be for com-
modities acceptable in international trade
and opportunities to get market recognition
for better-than-average practices. Soil carbon
will likely not be targeted separately from
aboveground C stocks, and the major changes
involved in the loss of tree biomass and the
use of peatlands will remain the primary at-
tractor of attention.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the prospects for carbon
markets to support plot- or farm-level
performance-based efforts effectively to in-
crease soil C storage are dim. However,
there is space for national aggregation to
commercially viable scales, by holistic
land-use accounting systems that include
soil C, with domestic incentive mechanisms
that support land-use practices from an ap-
proved list, and/or become part of inte-
grated land-use planning for low C emission
economies (Dewi
et al
., 2011).
Avoidance of depletion of soil organic
matter as part of land degradation and enhanced
restoration in depleted soils are of direct
importance to agriculture, ranching, forestry
and other land uses, but are also a relevant
part of national C accounting and the global
C cycle. 'Carbon markets' imply economic
performance-based incentives that relate
global climate and GHG concerns via national
Acknowledgements
Comments on an earlier version are ac-
knowledged with thanks from Unai Pascual
and other SCOPE workshop participants, as
well as from Keith Paustian, Sara Namirembe
and Betha Lusiana.
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