The Cognition of Conflict: Ontology, Dynamics, and Ideology - Conflict and Multimodal Communication: Social Research and Machine Intelligence - page 9

It is very relevant that another agent, X, might know what would be in the
best interest of Y, though Y himself does not know. This may create a very
important social relation, the “tutorial” relation: when X cares about Y's welfare
(goal achievement) and tries to encourage Y to pursue his own interest and not his
current preferences. This creates a crucial and strange social conflict between X and
Y, a “tutorial conflict,” not between the selfish goals of X and the selfish goals of Y,
but between two goals of Y, one represented by X and the other by Y (Castelfranchi
and Falcone 2000 ).
This conflict is typical of that between parents and children, doctors and patients,
teachers and students, government and the people. The problem is this: how can X
be X sure that something is “for the good of Y” if Y does not agree that it is? Is
X (consciously or unconsciously) following her own interests or conforming to the
pressures of society and its customs and expectations?
The most dramatic case I know of where a conflict was the familiar one was
between Vincent van Gogh and his brother Theo, who “lovingly” had Vincent placed
in a mental hospital (of course, “for his own good”) and finally induced Vincent to
commit suicide to liberate his poor, suffering family from the burden of his life as a
tramp.

1.3 Conflict vs. Contradictions: The Mind

as a Coherence-Seeking Device

There is a special relation between the contradiction between two epistemic/doxastic
representations (like beliefs) and the conflict between two motivational representa-
tions in both cases the mind needs to arrive at coherence. Let us examine some
aspects of this relation.

1.3.1 Coherence Seeking and Epistemic Conflicts

Propositionally conflicts are equivalent to explicit or implicit contradictions (P and
NotP), but a contradiction, to become/generate a real conflict, must be between two
motivational, not just doxastic, mental attitudes.
If I definitely believe that P and definitely believe that Not P, I'm in a
contradiction, whereas if I would like that P and would like that Not P, I'm in a
conflict. However, there are true “conflicts” in the epistemic domain.
Epistemic conflict . This is a conflict between, for example, two beliefs, infer-
ences, or opinions.
More precisely, directly or indirectly contradictory beliefs become or create a
“conflict” if and only if: