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why it is an internal reframing), TWO situates ONE's most specific statement in a
new perspective , hence accomplishing an external reframing. In order to distinguish
this kind of external reframing from the one that is analysed in the following section,
we class it as a substitutive external reframing.
As what concerns these conceptual strategies as argumentative strategies, one
can notice that internal reframing makes much more difficult to the speaker A
(in our case, S. Royal) to counter-attack (to try to cease the productivity of her
opponent's concepts), since speaker B is actually keeping the frame that speaker
A had proposed: speaker A is prisoner of her own statement, which has been
now turned against her position. Instead, when a speaker performs a substitutive
reframing, she gives a very different account of the situation proposed by speaker
A, so that this kind of reframing is overtly polemical. Hence, after a substitutive
reframing performed by speaker B (in our case, TWO), speaker A (ONE) is free to
develop her own point of view as well as to attack speaker B's vision, because only
the most specific part of her statement is kept within the opponent's position.
How would a description of this interaction using the notion of common ground
give an unsatisfactory result, as I claimed before? First of all, by applying the notion
of common ground we would have found that both speakers agree that the French
hate Blacks and Arabs , but we could not have accounted for the fact that this hatred
is not just a coincidence, as if we said that the French hate Blacks and Arabs
independently of their origin or colour of skin (those who are hated just happen
to be Black and Arab). According to this interaction, there is something in the fact
of being Black and Arab that engenders hate, “something” which is interpreted by
ONE as a racist attitude and by TWO as some kind of understandable behaviour .
More precisely, on this level, if we wanted to describe the common ground of this
dialogue, we could say that the piece of information that both ONE and TWO accept
as true is:
The Common Ground of the interaction contains:
(20) [the French hate the Arabs and the Blacks]
However, unlike what happens in the debate between Royal and Sarkozy, one
could say that the impossibility of describing the causal link that connects being
Black or Arab to hate, which is included in both positions, does not prevent us from
describing the common element in both points of view. This link would just be
left underspecified, yet the piece of information (20) could count as being what
the two participants think to be true (that is not the case with respect for “the
ethics of politics”, which is irreducible to a description of a state of affairs). On
the contrary, if we applied the common ground notion, we would not succeed
in obtaining a clear representation of the way the two positions differ. As far as
I know, there is no tool for describing the idea of frame, and a fortiori that of
frame substitution, within an informational perspective. There is no room in the
meta-language of an informational approach to see a semantic entity, like (20),
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