Identifying Secure Mobile Grid Use Cases - Cloud, Grid and High Performance Computing: Emerging Applications - page 189

fairly prioritize one application/ser-
vice over another.
• Malicious code/“malware”: this describes
any code that attempts to gain unauthorized
access to the Grid environment, to subse-
quently elevate its privileges, hide its exis-
tence, disguise itself as a valid component,
or propagate itself in clear violation of the
security policy of the enterprise Grid.
• Masquerading attacks : describes a class of
attacks where a valid Grid component may
be fooled into communicating or working
with another entity masquerading as valid
Grid component. Such an attack could per-
mit the disclosure or modification of in-
formation, the execution of unauthorized
transactions, etc.
• Mobile eavesdropper and traffic analyst :
such an adversary can at least perform
eavesdropping and collect as much infor-
mation as possible from intercepted traf-
fic. It is mobile and equipped with GPS
to know its exact location. The minimum
traffic it can intercept is the routing traffic
from the legitimate side. An eavesdropper
with enough resources is capable of ana-
lyzing intercepted traffic on the scene. This
ability gives the traffic analyst quick turn-
around action time about the event it de-
tects, and imposes serious physical threats
to mobile nodes.
• Mobile node intruder : if adequate physical
protection cannot be guaranteed for every
mobile node, node compromise is inevita-
ble within a long time window. A success-
ful passive node intruder is protocol com-
pliant, thus hard to detect. It participates
in collaborative network operations (e.g.,
ad hoc routing) to boost its attack strength
against mobile anonymity; thus it threat-
ens the entire network including all other
uncompromised nodes. This implies that a
countermeasure must not be vulnerable to
a single point of compromise.

• Object reuse : this describes how sensitive
data may become available to an unau-
thorized user, and used in a context other
than the one for which it was generated.
In the enterprise grid context, this is a
risk if a Grid component is not properly
decommissioned.
• Sniffing/snooping: : involves watching
packets as they travel through the network.
An enterprise Grid potentially introduces
additional network traffic between applica-
tions/services, the system and grid compo-
nents that should be protected. Failure to
address this threat may result in other types
of attacks including data manipulation and
replay attacks.

In addition to these, it is also necessary to adopt
the general security mechanisms applicable in any
enterprise scale IT infrastructure, and includes
physical security to protect against threats from
humans (either malicious or accidental) as well
as man-made and natural catastrophes.

OVERVIEW OF OUR PROCESS

A. Process of Development

The process is designed for building software
systems based on Mobile Grid computing with
security aspects. It is a process which builds, from
initial requirements and needs of Mobile Grid
systems, a secure executable software product.
It is not a process for including only security in
a development process but it is a development
process in itself incorporating security aspects
during all the process.
Our systematic process of development
(Rosado, Fernández-Medina, López, & Piattini,
2008) is an iterative and incremental process. An
iterative approach refers to the cyclic nature of
the process in which activities are repeated in a
structured manner and proposes an understanding