Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
(GASS, GridFTP) (“Globus Toolkit,”). Possibly
sensitive information being reported includes:
MonALISA service, which allows general users to
query site information from a web-based clickable
map interface. It monitors the following informa-
tion (Legrand, 2007):
•
Account Names
•
Historical system availability information
•
Currently running software information
•
System information for computer nodes
and clusters.
•
Internal System Paths
•
Network information (traffic, flows, con-
nectivity, topology) for WAN and LAN.
Given that site validation data is both being
collected at regular intervals, and being archived,
it offers the ability to track the state of a system
over time. This may provide information about
regular system downtimes, when a system may be
in a transitional state and particularly susceptible
to an attack.
Moreover, the archived nature of this informa-
tion suggests that the site is subject to a “Google
Hack” (Acunetix, “Google Hacking,”), even if
system data is no longer been published. An at-
tacker can use standard search-engine technology
to scan the Internet for systems that match certain
keywords. This can be used to scope out systems
with known vulnerabilities based on advertised
software levels. This is compounded by the fact
that modern search-engines like Google do their
own external caching and archiving of informa-
tion, creating a situation where anything that is
published on the web has the chance of persist-
ing, despite a site no longer wishing to make that
information publicly available. There are known
methods to prevent a site form being listed in a
search engine, and it is recommended to use these
for this kind of data.
•
Performance of applications, jobs and
services.
•
End user systems, and end-to-end perfor-
mance measurements.
Since this includes performance and load in-
formation for systems and networks, it could be
used to determine whether a machine is susceptible
to a Denial-Of-Service attack. In other words, it
could be used to target systems that are running
close to their maximum capacity.
This type of information is, however, ex-
tremely useful to legitimate users of a grid - it
helps them determine the optimal locations for
their workloads. If possible, it should only be
made available to grid users, without exposing it
to the outside world.
SUMMARY OF SECURITY RISKS
So far we have identified the following pieces of
information, that are published to the OSG, as
being potentially sensitive to a site:
Monitoring
1. Operating system and software level
information
2. Local account names
3. Supported grid user DNs
4. Underlying authentication methods
5. Job-manager / batch-system information
6. Internal system paths
7. Job names
8. Error and failure information
9. System load and performance information
The OSG uses the CEMon software for monitoring
sites. An analysis of this has already been included
in the “Resource Selection Information” section.
The OSG also supports an optional package
called MonALISA (MONitoring Agents using
a Large Integrated Services Architecture) to
monitor system availability and load. Sites using
MonALISA send system information to a central
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