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In-Depth Information
affairs involved in bioethical debate (as in everyday life and in most sciences) is
likely to have fuzzy edges and as regards borderline cases, without precise lines of
demarcation [19]. This is the case to face life and death (related to euthanasia, abor-
tion, and organ transplantation), personhood (abortion, embryonic research, hybrids,
animal experimentation), health and illness,
1
ordinary treatments versus extraordi-
nary ones, etc. etc.
In this vein, Sadegh-Zadeh [15] has remarked that most ethical rules depend on
some factual circumstances which are vague states of affairs and admit of degrees
to the effect that there is gradualness between their presence and absence.
For instance, a patient's life may be endangered slightly, moderately, or
severely. Similarly, the pneumonia of a patient may be slight, moderate, or
severe. The lower the degree of existence of such a state of affairs
X
,the
higher that of its complement not-
X
, and vice versa.
X
and not-
X
co-exist
to particular extents. This brings with it that if under the circumstance
X
an
action
Y
is obligatory (forbidden, or permitted) to a particular extent r, then
it is not obligatory (not forbidden, not permitted) to the extent 1
r
,re-
spectively. Thus, an action may be obligatory (forbidden, or permitted) and
not obligatory (not forbidden, not permitted) at the same time, respectively.
([15], pp. 153-154).
−
Remember that a property or a set is fuzzy in the sense that there are degrees of
possession thereof or belonging to such a set -so that the relationship of a member
belonging to a group varies in different degrees, in the same way as a property may
possess it or lack it in various amounts.
This gradualism of reality is reflected in two kinds of linguistic expressions: Ad-
verbs of intensity and decay: pretty, little, a lot, entirely, somewhat, ...; and, com-
parative constructions: healthier, more or less, so and so, likeness, similar, close,
etc.
In the case of life and death, for example, are undoubtedly gradual (fuzzy) pro-
cesses, not discrete phenomena that happen in one moment and don't happen in the
next one. The issue is that we learn to recognize life (to live) and death (to die) better
than to define them in a precise way. So, following Wittgenstein, recognition pre-
cedes and goes before definition and has a gradual character since we speak about
“more or less life” and “more or less death”, including not only the mere biological
sense of life but also its biographical and narrative sense. In some languages, as
Spanish, it is usual the expression “she is more dead than alive”.
Another example refers to the status of personhood, about what or who is a per-
son. We could consider two separate viewpoints: a) A person is every entity or
being (material) belonging to the
homo sapiens
kind (species). b) A person is ev-
ery thinking living being with reason, reflection, memory, and self-consciousness
(as Locke said). The former puts at the same level any material with human DNA
1
Health and illness are typical relational concepts or categories, with a triple dimension:
empirical, psychological, and social. Sadegh-Zadeh [16] develops a theory of prototype
diseases that allows for gradual membership in the category of diseases. See about this
issue the contribution of Lukas Kaelin in this volume.
