Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
The result for checking
criterion 1
is the OSCV found. It means that there is some
incorrectness in the security setup followed with security violation. After analyzing
the unsafe state, VCPU discloses nature of security flaw, detecting subjects, objects,
and their attributes that lead to protection weakness. The evaluation verdict is "
system
is unsafe by the given criterion
", because members of '
Users
' have the '
Read Data
' and
'
Write Data
' access in the ACL, corresponding to
Normal.dot
.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed to formal basics of OSCVs verification approach for
secure operating systems. We discussed a technique of the vulnerabilities analysis and
a formal processing tool, the VCPU. All these allow to specify the system security-
related elements and proof the system safety.
The VCPU facility brings our vulnerability checking method to practice. The
targets of its applications (being integrated into SEW toolkit) are the computer
systems based on the granular security: the operating systems, DBMSs, and firewalls.
Our approach is very useful for administrators and security officers to monitor the
system securable resources (files, shared folders, printers, accounts, etc). It allows any
user to discover security of her or his system in the depth, and thus open the 'holes' in
the protection. The OSCVs, as mentioned, represent a very serious problem in the
modern operating systems. Contemporary systems operate with a huge number of
security settings, and the user needs some tools that could explain the whys and
wherefores of security weaknesses. The VCPU utility makes this process closer to
person than ever, because while logical resolving it marks the clause that caused fault
of OSCV-criterion, and supplies user with a true reason of the security flaw.
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