Agreements & MOUs - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 190

Farakka; both sides stuck to their own stands. Two Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) were signed by India and Bangladesh - the first in October 1982 and the
other in October 1985 on sharing of the available dry season flow at Farakka. The
first MOU was for two years only, commencing from the dry season of 1984 and the
second for three years from the dry season of 1986. In these five years, there was
notable shift in the aims and objectives of the Bangladesh government. A section
of Bangladesh politicians and officials realized the impracticability of their earlier
stand of constructing a number of storage dams in the upper reaches of the Ganga
tributaries, most of which would be in Nepal and India. However, a new thinking
emerged slowly and rather secretly, to which support was meagre in all concerned
quarters.
According to the new thinking, sharing of available dry-season flow of the Ganga
at Farakka would be a separate issue, not to be confused with the long-term scheme
of augmentation of dry season flow in the river. The thinkers favoured signing a
long-term agreement with India to foreclose giving a chance to India to draw more
water from the Ganga's upper reaches in dry season but they did not get much
support in Bangladesh until 1996.
The new thinking was initiated by Anisul Islam Mehmud, the then Water
Resources Minister; he was in favour of a long-term sharing of water of not only
the Ganga but of all the 54 rivers that flow from India into Bangladesh - three big,
namely, the Ganga, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna and 51 small ones. Only some
technocrats of Bangladesh supported his idea. Humayun Rashid Chaudhury, the then
Foreign Minister, was a staunch supporter of the 'old line' and had more influence
in the cabinet.
In India too, there was a radical change in the approach to the issue. The then
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi wanted an early settlement of the issues but his gov-
ernment did not want to shift its stand, to remain consistent in its policy toward a
new neighbouring country.
Anyway, the new thinking in Bangladesh along with India's eagerness for a quick
and durable solution of the twin problems of sharing and augmenting the dry-season
flow of the Ganga at Farakka gradually received diplomatic and technical support in
Bangladesh. Dhaka realized that a short-term agreement with New Delhi of two to
three years' validity would not boost overall development of its water resources, nor
would it provide any security for Bangladesh to seek technical and financial support
from the outside world. Other countries will not make any large investment on devel-
oping water resources in Bangladesh, unless they are assured of future availability
of water in any river.
Moreover, planning and execution of a long-term scheme take much more time
than a short-term arrangement. It also realized that sharing could be a bilateral issue
but augmentation would not be possible without involving Nepal, or other coun-
tries, which makes the issues trilateral, or multilateral. If water from the Ganga was
available to Bangladesh following a long-term treaty with India, it could plan major
irrigation schemes. At the same time, an agreement on all rivers flowing from India
to Bangladesh would assure huge volume of water, which India alone could uti-
lize by constructing small dams and barrages within its own territory. This was an