Agreements & MOUs - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 155

cancelled at the last moment and ended in fiasco. The leaders did not know, how the
interests of Bangladesh could be protected. As Khursida Begum wrote in her topic,
the experts of Bangladesh, failing to get the expected mediation of the international
body, were in a restless state of mind, as to how to deal with India and to protect
their country's interest. They felt, at least an agreement was necessary.
When the agreement was on the anvil, B. M. Abbas, a leading expert of
Bangladesh expressed his view on the Farakka Agreement in a conversation with
the President Ziaur Rahman:
I was, by the time, quite anxious to get the Agreement finalized. The President at one stage,
enquired, what would happen, if India did not renew the Agreement after five years. I said,
who could say what would happen in future. The President did not commit himself immedi-
ately. Perhaps sensing my anxiety and to indicate his mind, he added that I need not worry;
everything would be all right by the grace of Allah.
From the above, it was obvious that both sides were keen to find a workable for-
mula for sharing the Ganga water at Farakka, even for a short period. India wanted
not only to protect and further her interests but also to maintain good relation with
a new country in the neighbourhood, even by sacrificing her own interests, to some
extent. For this reason only, the Government of India agreed to release more than
60% of the Ganga flow in the leanest months of March and April. Bangladesh was
satisfied that her interests received priority and the government was successful in
signing such an agreement.
Ben Crow in his topic, 'Sharing the Ganges' stated that it was the decisions of
the Janata government in India that made the understanding possible.
He added that the agreement reflected the concerns of the time and defined the
development of water resources of the Ganga basin solely in terms of increasing the
dry-season flow. As shortage of water had caused the dispute to arise, the agreement,
in its long-term arrangements of augmentation, maintained this focus. There was no
provision for general regulation and development of the river's resources and little
concern for floods. He further stated that even with this concentration on increas-
ing the dry-season flow, subsequent discussions between the two governments did
not materialize. Bangladesh refused to embark on feasibility studies of alternative
schemes, unless Nepal was allowed to participate in the negotiations. India was
unwilling to allow Nepal's participation, because the Indian government insisted
that augmentation was a bilateral matter.
The political will of both the countries helped their leaders solve the long-
standing problems of sharing the Ganga water at Farakka. Though it was originally
technical, it turned out to be a political problem, affecting diplomatic relations
between them. The goodwill gesture by India by agreeing to substantial reduc-
tion of the Ganga water to 20,500 cusecs, scaling down the original demand for
40,000 cusecs was more from political than from technical consideration. The
concession by Bangladesh government by accepting 34,500 cusecs as against the
original demand of 44,000 cusecs is a much lesser sacrifice, because many of their
other demands were met. It has to be kept in mind that India's three joint rivers