Agreements & MOUs - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 154

to 31 May 1976, as against the excavated depth of 6 m. This test-running was essen-
tial for avoiding possible damage to the dry canal and therefore, the accord for
maximizing release cannot be considered for future lean seasons. After 31st May
1975, the discharge in feeder canal gradually increased up to its design-capacity of
40,000 cusecs in presence of the representatives of Bangladesh. Thus, an agreement
by the two countries was absolutely necessary on the sharing of the lean season
discharge at Farakka.
The Indian Parliament witnessed noisy scenes in 1978, when the Congress Party,
then in opposition, described the agreement of 1977 in the Rajya Sabha (upper
house) as a sell-out of India's interest. Indira Gandhi, who was the opposition leader
in the Lok Sabha (House of Representatives), said: 'If the Government does not
ensure adequate water supply to Calcutta Port, it will affect our national interest'.
The people and the Government of West Bengal, at that time formed by a coali-
tion of Left parties, led by Jyoti Basu of the Communist Party of India (Marxist),
opposed the accord vehemently, as they felt that the interests of the State and the
people were compromised. They wanted the increased flow of the Ganga water
into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and save Calcutta Port. An all-party delegation of
the State MPs, led by Prabhash Chandra Roy, State Minister for Irrigation and
Waterways, called on S. S. Barnala, India's Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation on
15 th September 1977 and submitted a memorandum on the Farakka Barrage issue.
Mr. Barnala assured them that the interest of the Calcutta Port would be kept in
view. The State Congress Party also sent a delegation led by Mrs. P. Mukherjee to
the Prime Minister who iterated his awareness of the problems of the port. Mr. Desai
also assured Jyoti Basu that the city's interest would not be sacrificed by the Farakka
Agreement.
When the Agreement was finalized, neither West Bengal Government, nor the
Farakka Barrage Project Authority, nor Calcutta Port Trust was associated with it.
They were kept in the dark, which gave rise to resentment in all concerned quar-
ters and the State government. After finalization, Jyoti Basu told reporters that West
Bengal would protest to the Centre against the Agreement, because Calcutta Port
could not be saved, unless 40,000 cusecs of water were available from Farakka
Barrage. A. B. Vajpayee, then Foreign Minister of the Janata Government (later
Prime Minister from 1999 to 2004) criticized the previous Congress regime for sign-
ing two specific agreements with Bangladesh - the first in 1974 under which India
was debarred from commissioning the barrage without the consent of Bangladesh
and the second was the 1975 short-term agreement, under which India was com-
mitted to draw between 11,000 and 16,000 cusecs. Mr. Vajpayee added that 40,000
cusecs were India's maximum need but in lean season, when the flow went down
to 55,000 cusecs, withdrawal of 40,000 cusecs would leave only 15,000 cusecs for
Bangladesh and none in the world could possibly appreciate this.
The public reaction in Bangladesh was not known but expectedly, the leadership
in Bangladesh was demoralized for failing to get a satisfactory solution of the water-
sharing issue in an international body, like the United Nations. A much-publicized
Quixotic march of thousands of Bangladeshis, led by a firebrand trade union leader,
Maulana Bhasani to demolish the barrage with tongs and hammers in 1977 was