Agreements & MOUs - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 149

Another point in Part A needs a special look. The agreement was drawn on the
basis of past records of flow, reaching Farakka from 1948 to 1973 except for four
years, from 1974 to 1977; the reasons were not mentioned anywhere. In fact, the
flow reduced further in those four years, but was not reflected in the Agreement.
It was based on the total volume of water to be shared. The share of India varied
between 42.9% and 37.3% but not on a linear distribution. The distribution was
erratic, because it was the flow likely to be available at Farakka. This left a scope
for adjustments and complication in the operation of the gates of the barrage as well
as of the head regulator. Had it been a linear distribution, based on actual flow at
Farakka, in a ratio decided by the representatives of both countries and reflected in
the Agreement, its implementation on the ground as well as the operation of the
barrage and the head regulator gates could be much easier.
Both sides were convinced of the scarcity of dry-season flow to meet respec-
tive requirements which needed minimum of 84,000 (40,000+44,000) cusecs in the
leanest season. They realized the need for augmentation of the flow through some
other means. In fact, the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), constituted in 1972 with
representation of both the governments, aimed at augmentation of the Ganga flow
through suitable schemes and actions, initiated much earlier. Thus, both sides real-
ized the necessity of developing water resources in the Ganga basin for increasing
the dry season flow.
Part B of the Agreement, dwelling on long-term arrangements provided a scope
for augmenting the flow. The JRC was entrusted with taking appropriate action,
proposed or to be proposed by both countries at a later date. Both had already for-
mulated their proposals for augmentation which were under consideration of the
JRC. We shall see later, how the proposals of the two countries were divergent and
invited conflicts between them, leading to a deadlock.
As regards Part C, dealing with 'review and duration', the agreement was short-
term with five years' validity, from the date of coming into force; it could be
extended for a specified period by mutual consent, as provided in Article XV. The
provision for review was made in Article XIII, after three years from the date of
effect, to be made on the basis of past working, impact, implementation and progress
of the arrangements, specified in Parts A and B, as mentioned in Article XIV. We
shall see later how this review has become fruitless in spite of the provision for
extension of the agreement for another five years.
There were two side-letters to the agreement-one from Bangladesh and the
other from India, both dated 5th November 1977, confirming a point, raised by
Bangladesh. It related to the proposal on augmentation and the scheme, or the
schemes, for building storages in the upper reaches of the Ganga in Nepal.
In short, the dispute arose owing to the shortage of dry-season flow in the
Ganga and on its sharing ratio, but the excessive initiative and hurry by the Janata
Government in Delhi to improve India's relation with the new republic and com-
promised national interest in the agreement reflected the main motto of achieving
political objective of scoring over the previous Congress regime, led by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi. It became clear, why the Congress Government was so
rigid on the demands of the military rulers of Bangladesh and was dragging its