Agreements & MOUs - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 147

The agreement had three parts; Part A dealt with arrangement for sharing of the
Ganga water at Farakka; Part B with long-term arrangements and Part C with review
and duration. In a broad sense, the agreement was unsatisfactory, as the Part A
dealt with the available water resource at Farakka, without going into reasons for
its gradual decrease and suggesting action and to plug loopholes, where ever pos-
sible. The realities were not considered and the development activities of the two
countries were either overlooked, or side-tracked. Technical considerations were
over-shadowed by political motives for achieving success in foreign affairs within
a short time by both the Governments. It is a fact that the lean-season discharge in
the Ganga was falling for many reasons, one of which was the increase of with-
drawal by The States in the upper reaches. The understanding was reached within
a year of the Janata government coming to power in Delhi by giving substantial
concession to Bangladesh at the cost of India's interests. Out of these divisions, the
driest period of three 10-daily periods of last two in April and first one of May,
need special mention, as the concessions were maximum during this period (more
than 62% to Bangladesh). National interest including that of Calcutta Port was com-
pletely overlooked at the cost of improving bilateral relations. The rigidity, followed
so long by both the Governments (the Congress in India and the military rule in
Bangladesh) was diluted by the Janata government. In fact, India was willing to
give more concessions, according to a statement by a secretary in Indian's Finance
Ministry associated with the 1977 negotiations, as quoted by 'Ben Crow'.
The new government was willing to make more concessions. They wanted to project an
image of having achieved success in foreign policy in a short time. What they did with
Pakistan and Nepal amounted to getting over some mental blocks. But with Bangladesh,
there was a calculated sacrifice of the national interest with a view to achieving wider
purposes. We thought that if the biggest irritant was removed, the climate would change.
On the country, concession by Bangladesh was quite small. Their demand for
44,000 cusecs in dry season: was cut down to 34,500 cusecs, with a 'distress clause',
which was favourable to Bangladesh. Figure 10.1 and Table 10.1 show, how con-
cessions were allowed by India to Bangladesh against very small concessions given
by the latter.
Table 10.1 shows that the percent share of India from the total available flow
at Farakka varied from 42.9 in January to 37.3 in the last 10-daily in April. The
percent share of Bangladesh in the corresponding period varied from 57.1 to 62.7,
i.e. in the driest period of last 10-daily of April. The percent share of Bangladesh was
higher than India's and also of other periods of the season. Regarding concessions
by India and Bangladesh against their demands of 40,000 cusecs and 44,000 cusecs
respectively, that by India, from second 10-daily in January to last 10-daily in April
varied from 1.7 % to 35.4%. In the same period, Bangladesh gained from 8.1 to 2.9
in second 10-daily in January to first 10-daily in February after a concession ranging
from 2.1 to 17.3. Thus India's sacrifice was more than Bangladesh's, particularly
in the leanest season in end of April. Bangladesh demanded restoration of the so-
called 'historic' or 'natural' flow into the Ganga without human Interference, i.e.
as it was pre-barrage, but in the context of global scientific and technical advances,
a developing country like India should not have remained a silent spectator to the