what-when-how
In Depth Tutorials and Information
of the presented analysis limited the contributing factors to accidents occurring at sea
to the mechanical functionality of the ship itself, environmental conditions such as
wind, time of day, etc., and human error. Human error was considered to be the major
factor contributing to accidents occurring at sea but it was introduced that external
factors outside the present system need to be considered under the risk analysis. To
accurately represent the system of interest all relevant parties at every level must be
identiied. his includes government bodies, shipyard owners, company investors,
and any other organizational body that is involved or associated with the decision-
making process related to the well-being of the company.
Each of the above discussed works describes the complexities associated with
accurately representing the different systems. A sociotechnical system consists of
interactions between a social and technical infrastructure. he degree of complexity
associated with each infrastructure varies but, regardless of the complexity, each one
must be accurately represented to produce accurate results upon performing risk anal-
ysis. he two infrastructures must irst be studied independently of one another, iden-
tifying the variables of interest and identifying how these variables can be extracted
from real-time operation of a given infrastructure. A model for each infrastructure
will then be constructed to represent the relevant entities and relationships identi-
ied previously. he modeled systems can then be subdued to diferent conditions of
threat to characterize how it affects the functionality of the model. It will also assist in
identifying which entities are most significant on the infrastructure of interest.
Upon completion of analyzing the social and technical infrastructures indepen-
dently, analysis must be performed on the two with respect to the other. he two
infrastructures must be further studied to determine what relationships are occur-
ring between them. he independently constructed models are combined or linked
together with the identified relationships between them, representing the socio-
technical system as a single model. Once again, the model is subdued to different
conditions of threat to determine how each infrastructure responds in relation to
the other. his analysis will provide a measure of performance for the whole system
consisting of all relationships occurring within and between both infrastructures.
In conclusion of this risk analysis, a system of support for decision making can
be constructed to determine what aspects of the two infrastructures need to be
improved to prevent future threats from occurring or improving the system's ability
to handle or respond the occurrence.
References
1. European Transport Safety Council (ETSC), 2001, EU Transport Accident, Incident
and Casualty Databases: Current Status and Future Needs, http://www.etsc.be.
2. Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), 1998, Safety Study of the
Operational Relationship between Ship Master/Watchkeeping Officers and Marine
Pilots, http://www.bst.gc.ca.