Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Communications, Posts and Telegraphs. Burma/Myanmar has only two internet
service providers, and both outlets charge high prices for email accounts. To
implement its censorship, the government purchases software from the U.S.
company Fortinet to block access to selected websites and servers. At times, the
state has resorted to blunter instruments: when it sought to silence demonstrators in
2007, it switched off the country's internet network altogether for 6 weeks.
Seeking to encourage growth of his country's information technology sector,
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad declared publicly in 1996 that there
would be no censorship of the internet, in part to give his country an edge over
neighboring rival Singapore. As a result, ''pro-reform websites have matured from
a cacophony of accusatory and insulting diatribes into an alternative, independent
media'' (Abbott
2001
, p. 105). However, in 2002, the Malaysian government
signaled its intent to require website operators to obtain licenses precisely for the
purpose of monitoring content, and has tried to restrict Muslim fundamentalists
from publishing on the web. The country's famed Multimedia Corridor, however,
designed to attract foreign investors, remains a censorship-free zone, revealing that
the geographies of censorship vary not only among countries but within them as
well.
The authoritarian government of Singapore, one of the world's best-connected
and technologically dynamic countries, also censors the internet regularly (Rodan
2000
). Its primary vehicle in this regard is the Singapore Media Development
Authority (MDA), which has regulated internet content under the guise of moni-
toring a broadcasting service since 1996. All ISPs are automatically licensed by
the Singapore Broadcasting Authority, which routes all internet connections
through government proxy servers. Licensees are required to comply with the 1996
Internet Code of Practice, which includes a definition of ''prohibited material,''
i.e., content that it deems ''objectionable on the grounds of public interest, public
morality, public order, public security, national harmony, or is otherwise prohib-
ited by applicable Singapore laws'' (OpenNet Initiative
2006
, p. 3). Moreover,
''the government has at times taken unannounced strolls through several thousand
personal computers with internet connections, subsequently explaining such
actions as sweeping for viruses or pornography'' (Kalathil and Boas
2003
, p. 78).
Self-censorship is also encouraged as a means to stifle political expression. The
use of lawsuits under stringent defamation laws is also common, and can reach
well beyond the island's perimeter. For example, Jiahoa Chen, a Singaporean
student at the University of Illinois, was forced to shut down his caustic.blog under
threat from the government-run Agency for Science, Technology, and Research
(OpenNet Initiative
2006
). As a result of these measures, Singapore's government
has achieved near-total control over its internet environment with minimal loss of
political legitimacy. Zittrain and Palfrey (
2008
), however, argue that Singapore's
censorship has been exaggerated and is largely confined to a handful of porno-
graphic websites.
