Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Essentially, censorship involves control over internet access, functionality, and
contents (Eriksson and Giacomello
2009
). Precise filtering is almost impossible,
but there is a wide variety of methods are used to control the flow of digital
information, including requiring discriminatory ISP licenses, content filtering
based on keywords, redirection of users to proxy servers, rerouting packets des-
tined for a specific IP address to a blacklist, website blocking of a list of IP
addresses, tapping and surveillance, chat room monitoring, discriminatory or
prohibitive pricing policies, hardware and software manipulation, hacking into
opposition websites and spreading viruses, denial-of-service (DOS) attacks that
overload servers or network connections using ''bot herders,'' temporary just-in-
time blocking at moments when political information is critical, such as elections,
and harassment of bloggers (e.g., via libel laws or invoking national security).
Content filtering often relies on keyword matching algorithms that evolve as the
Internet's lingo changes, and filtering may occur at the levels of the ISP, the
domain name, a particular IP address, or a specific URL. Most forms of filtering
are difficult to detect technically: the user may not even know that censorship is at
work. Most ISPs lack the ability to block transmission to an individual IP address
or URL, so governments undertaking this task in volume frequently purchase
foreign (usually American) software for this purpose. Filtering mechanisms suffer
the risk of overblocking, or ''false positives,'' i.e., blocking access to sites that
were not intended to be censored, and underblocking, or ''false negatives,'' i.e.,
allowing access to sites that were intended to be prohibited (Murdoch and
Anderson
2008
). Most common and particularly important is self-censorship, as
the bulk of casual internet users well understand the boundaries of politically
acceptable use within their respective states. Often cultivating a persuasive,
hegemonic view of dominant powers is more efficient than outright force. Typi-
cally both persuasion and coercion are combined as local contexts demand. Once
formal censorship is initiated, no matter how benign or transparent, the temptation
to enlarge its scope, or what Villeneuve (
2006
) calls ''mission creep,'' is always
there.
The institutions used to enforce such policies, which are typically outgrowths of
older media regulatory regimes concerned with newspapers, radio, and television,
are usually government ministries of information and communication. The degree
of centrality in the management of internet censorship varies considerably.
Because the state is not a monolithic entity but composed of diverse agencies,
sometimes working at cross-purposes, rather than view censorship as the simple
repression of oppositional discourses it is more instructive to think of it in terms of
multiple, sometimes contradictory authorities that invoke diverse strategies of
suppression of various groups and individuals for a broad array of reasons and
motivations. Adding to this complexity is the rapidity with which the internet has
grown and changed technologically; often government censors have difficulty
keeping up-to-date with changing technologies (e.g., text messaging) or slang
terms used to communicate hidden meanings.
The degree and type of internet censorship obviously varies widely and reflects
how democratic and open to criticism different political systems are. Reporters
