Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Internet accessibility reflects, inter alia, the willingness of governments to
allow or encourage their populations to log-into cyberspace. Repressive govern-
ments often fear the emancipatory potential of the internet, which allows indi-
viduals to circumvent tightly controlled media. Theorizations of internet
censorship can draw fruitfully on contemporary geographic discussions of the
state, power, and discourse. Foucauldian perspectives loom large in this regard.
Critical analyses of cyberspace, for example, point to geosurveillance, invasions of
privacy, and the formation of digital panopticons (Crampton
2007
; Dobson and
Fisher
2007
). Such work has demonstrated that clearly the internet can be made to
work against people as well as for them. Far from being innately emancipatory in
nature, cyberspace can be used to reinforce hegemonic powers, cultivate a climate
of fear, and prevent or minimize dissent.
3.1 Motivations and Mechanisms of Internet Censorship
There are multiple motivations for internet censorship, and thus several forms and
types, including political repression of dissidents, human rights activists, or com-
ments insulting to the state (e.g., in China, Iran, Burma/Myanmar); religious controls
to inhibit the dissemination of ideas deemed heretical or sacrilegious (as found in
many Arab states); protections of intellectual property, including restrictions on
illegally downloaded movies and music; or cultural restrictions that exist as part of
the oppression of ethnic minorities (e.g., refusal to allow government websites in
certain languages) or sexual minorities (i.e., gays and lesbians). Typically, gov-
ernments that seek to impose censorship do so using the excuse of protecting public
morality from ostensible sins such as pornography or gambling, although more
recently combating terrorism has emerged as a favorite rationale. Deliberately vague
notions of national security and social stability are typically invoked as well. Other
proponents hold that some degree of censorship is needed to combat ''cyberanar-
chy'' (Goldsmith
1998
) or to prevent crime (Katyal
2001
).
Governments face a choice in the degree of censorship, including its scope (or
range of topics) and depth (or degree of intervention), which ranges from allowing
completely unfettered flows of information (e.g., Denmark) to prohibiting access
to the internet altogether (e.g., North Korea); most opt for a position between these
two poles. Thus, the conflict between internet free speech and national territorial
laws speaks to the notion that the ''power container'' of the nation-state has
sustained mounting ''leakages'' to and from the world-system. Most frequently,
interventions to limit access or shape the contents of cyberspace reflect highly
centralized power structures, notably authoritarian one-party countries concerned
with an erosion of legitimacy. As Villeneuve (
2006
) points out, countries seeking
sovereignty over their cyber-territories often generate unintended consequences to
censorship (e.g., diminished innovation, negative publicity that may lead to pariah
status, reduced tourism, or offended corporations), results that policy makers rarely
anticipate or acknowledge when putting such systems into place.
