Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
before and during the EIA processes. The latest ruling of the Supreme
Administrative Court rejecting the Chelopech EIA for violations of the
EIA timeline and consultation guidelines may be a sign of change, but it
is too early to tell. One other set of obstacles to clear legal paths and the
rule of law are contradictions in the law itself, which increase the discre-
tion of both the courts and other institutional actors. For example,
Bulgaria's environmental laws do not require an EIA to get a permit for
exploration, whereas the Law on Underground Resources does require
an EIA for such a permit (Bacheva 2006).
Transnational Actors and Arenas
Several transnational actors and arenas have been involved in these gold-
mining cases, largely through the efforts of the NGO coalition. Bulgaria
and other postcommunist countries have undergone a fourth transition
of transnationalism (see Orenstein, Bloom, and Lindstrom 2008a for a
recent argument to this effect) intertwined with their political and eco-
nomic transitions and their transition to independent statehood—in
some cases, renewed or new nation-states, in others independence from
the oversight of the USSR. This argument about the growth of transna-
tionalism and its interaction with other areas of change can be extended
to many developing countries as well. Transnational actors of all sorts—
corporations, fi nancial institutions, international organizations, transna-
tional nongovernmental organizations—are often involved in investment
decisions and the politics around them. For Bulgaria, the European
Union with its extensive body of law, oversight mechanisms, and
resources, is the most important of these actors. As Vachudova (2008)
points out, the EU intensifi es the effects of other transnational actors.
Still the timing of the contracts and original EIA processes, completed
before Bulgaria's accession to the EU, and the reliance of the EU on
national institutions to carry out EU policies, have limited the direct
power of Brussels to infl uence outcomes in these cases.
Activism at the transnational level can affect decision making through
two main channels: by infl uencing the decisions of the state in which the
investment is situated and by infl uencing the investor. Because the primary
transnational arena of importance to the Bulgarian state during the
period since these investment controversies arose has been the European
Union, the coalition has been very active in bringing the issues surround-
ing these investments, particularly the Chelopech and Krumovgrad cases,
to the attention of various EU institutions. The coalition has established
contacts with the European Parliament, the European Commission, and
