Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Chinese petro-imperialism and the ensuing screams of the next Darfur”
(Clasper 2005, 42). Indeed, China's operations in Sudan and Burma are
particularly alarming.
5
China is criticized for its neocolonial practices,
including exploring for and extracting oil in Burma, which in a climate
of political oppression has led to land seizures, local economic destabi-
lization, and polluted rivers (Arakan Oil Watch 2008).
6
It has also been
criticized for arming Sudan, heightening internal displacement there,
and underwriting Sudan's human rights abuses (Askouri 2007; Hurst
2006; Junger 2007; Manji and Marks 2007; Zweig and Jianhai 2005).
Finally, China has been faulted for potentially swaying other oil-needy
nations, such as India, to disregard international standards when acquir-
ing oil overseas (Chen 2007). As addressed in Max Stephenson and Lisa
Schweitzer's chapter on Ogoniland (chapter 3), China is also a major
stakeholder in Nigeria, where Northern oil companies have often oper-
ated with impunity.
7
For oil access in low-income nations, China offers low-interest, easy-
payment loans without regulatory stipulations, bids the lowest or the
highest, forgives debt, provides bilateral trade agreements, and builds
schools, hospitals, railroads, bridges, and dams (Gu, Humphrey, and
Messner 2008; Guttal 2008; Hanson 2008; Junger 2007; Manji and
Marks 2007; Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Yet it remains unclear whether
the seeming benevolent offers of assistance mimic Northern offers that
fail to alleviate poverty or to meet the catholic demands of affected
communities (Widener 2007a, 2009), or whether China's aid actually
meets the unmet need of such communities.
Pointing to the former and indicating a potential underlining intent,
Guttal (2008, 45, 18) suggests that China's overseas partnerships and
practices “have begun to dangerously resemble colonialism,” citing a
perilous example in which 30,000 Chinese families were relocated to
Laos to work in the fi elds, build large-scale projects, and manage small
businesses. For access to Sudan's fi elds, China vetoes or dilutes UN initia-
tives to hold Sudan accountable for its ongoing human rights abuses
(Chen 2007).
8
Even though China refers to this policy as one of nonin-
terference, it undoubtedly interferes in Sudan's grassroots democratic
efforts (Askouri 2007). Given that China also imports its own skilled
labor, uses its own supplies, and hires its own service companies when
operating overseas, there is evidence that Chinese interests are met fi rst,
followed by local interests, if at all.
Furthermore, China's development aid and lending practices,
9
which
are offered without demands for political or economic reform, pit them
