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and competitive market operation. Given
that the government's overriding policy
objective since 1984 had been the economic
reform of the New Zealand economy (Evans,
Grimes, Wilkinson & Teece, 1996), there is
little apparent justification for accepting this
hypothesis.
7
Clear Communications v Telecom Corpora-
tion (1993) 5 TCLR 166 (HC) 25, 27, 35,
103
8
Clear Communications v Telecom Corpora-
tion (1993) 5 TCLR 413 (CA) 25
9
Telecom Corporation v Clear Communica-
tions [1994] 5 NZBLC 103, 552 (PC); [1995]
1 NZLR 385 (PC) passim
10
Despite the implications of its title, TUANZ
is an association comprised principally of
Telecom's wholesale (i.e. competitor) cus-
tomers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
It has no mandate to represent Telecom's
retail customers.
11
The Opposition at the time was comprised
largely of members of the previous gov-
ernment, which had severed the ANZUS
strategic military alliance with the United
States on the basis of its inconsistency with
New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy.
12
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/
Page____16432.aspx#tor
13
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Multi-
pageDocumentTOC____16484.aspx
14
These recommendations were made despite
an absence of any compelling evidence that
the New Zealand industry had performed any
worse than the regimes imposing the types of
regulation recommended, and in particular
in the presence of clear evidence that by dint
of the 'price cap', real residential telephone
prices had fallen by a greater margin in New
Zealand than the OECD average (Howell,
2008).
15
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0804/
S00241.htm
16
It is no coincidence that TUANZ has a sepa-
rate membership division catering solely for
operators of call centres, as such customers
would be most beneficial to small, new
competitors to a large, incumbent network
such as Telecom.
17
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Multi-
pageDocumentPage____4850.aspx
1
Although the obligations for funding the
'Kiwi Share' obligations were subsequently
incorporated into the Telecommunications
Act, where they were renamed the Telecom-
munications Service Obligation ('TSO'),
the contractual obligations with respect to
Telecom's pricing obligations remain in
place.
2
Changes to prices (outside these guidelines)
or any of the other terms, required the ap-
proval of the Minister of Communications.
3
At their own expense, even though the Post
Office appropriated the assets paid for by
residents under the petition system.
4
Personal communication with an opposition
Member of Parliament with responsibility
for telecommunications policy.
5
It is noted that these assumptions rely upon
a static technological environment, and that
there were undoubtedly productive inef-
ficiencies within the firm that remained to
be competed away. However, given that the
firm was sold in a fully deregulated environ-
ment, and privatization would undoubtedly
eliminate some of these inefficiencies, the
price at which the firm changed ownership
would have reflected some middle ground
between each party's assessment of the value
of potential savings. Any margins remaining
for Telecom's shareholders once the produc-
tive efficiency gains were realized would be
expected to be competed away when entry
occurred.
6
Clear was subsequently merged into Telstra-
Saturn, a company formed by the purchase
by Telstra of Saturn Communications, to
form TelstraClear. (Howell, 2007:17).
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