New directions in conflict research from an economics perspective - Conflicts Over Natural Resources in the Global South - page 39

Ted Gurr pertained more to individual motivation rather than group dynamics. Iden-
tity is also crucial to intra-state conflict. Group dynamics require the resolution of
the collective action problem, as discussed in Olson (1965). In order to mobilise large
groups to undertake collective action and fight other groups, intra-group mistrust,
monitoring difficulties and the free-rider problems have to be overcome. Ethnic identi-
ties, whether based on race, language, religion, tribal affiliation or regional differences,
may serve as a more effective amalgam for the purposes of group formation compared
to other forms of difference based on individual inequality such as socioeconomic class.
No conflict can proceed without the presence of palpably perceived group differences
or grievances, which may have historical dimensions. Frances Stewart (2000) coined
the phrase horizontal inequality , the inequality between groups, rather than individ-
ual inequality within otherwise homogenous populations (vertical inequality). Crucial
here are the more enduring (or hard to change) dimensions of inequality (Tilly 1998),
and inequality of opportunity, compared to relatively more transient causes of inequal-
ity (like current income), such as the manner in which certain groups are discriminated
against, simply because of their ethnic characteristics, as opposed to other personal
attributes.
3.2.2 Social contract
Ultimately, the greed and grievance motivations for conflict may actually be insep-
arable. Even if one theory is better at motivating the start of conflict, the other
phenomenon is sure to follow. Thus, it is not uncommon for a conflict linked to
palpable grievances, for example, to mutate into a situation where the rebels become
greedy, and both greed and grievance can be seen to co-exist. It appears that the greed
explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars performs well, in terms of sta-
tistical significance, in cross-country studies, but has to make way for grievance-based
arguments in country-case studies, even in quantitative analyses. Grievances and hor-
izontal inequalities may, after all, be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but not
necessarily why they persist because conflicts require finance, and without internal
mechanisms of war finance conflicts may be quickly ended by external intervention
(unless the external intervention backs one side in a civil war). Although the presence
of either greed or grievance is necessary for the outbreak of violent conflict, they are
not sufficient. This requires institutional breakdown for peaceful conflict resolution,
which may be described as the failure of the social contract (Murshed 2010). The
remainder of this sub-section summarises the arguments therein.
The social contract refers to the mechanisms within society that resolve conflict
without outright violence. It contains a moral, economic and political component both
at national and local levels. It also implies a functional view of the state: governments
exist to serve a purpose, and rule is by consent. Contemporary civil wars are more
often related to the breakdown of explicit or implicit mechanisms to share power and
resources, rather than the complete absence of an agreement to govern these. This
is true even in the most extreme cases of so called state failure, such as in Somalia.
Cold war rivalries and the interventions of external powers in the domestic affairs of
other countries may also undermine an existing social contract. Among the various
factors, two domestic reasons leading to the decline of the social contract deserve
special mention.