Engaging Legal Systems in Small-Scale Gold Mining Conflicts in Three South American Countries - Conflicts Over Natural Resources in the Global South - page 136

Nieuw Koffiekamp gold miners to mine on the Gros Rosebel concession, even though
the gold miners interpret it as such. It only states that 25 registered groups of Makam-
boa members and their mining equipment will obtain badges, and that “Rosebel Gold
Mines is willing to consider reasonably how it can assist Makamboa logistically to
develop legal activities in the triangle area/exploration as discussed in the meeting''
(Agreement 2010, emphasis added). The purpose of the “badges'' and the exact mean-
ing of “willing to consider'' remain undefined. According to the company, Rosebel
Gold Mines cannot formally allow small-scale gold miners to mine on its conces-
sion because the national mining law states that only the national mining authority
can extend mining permits. According to observers, the wording was intentionally
kept vague because the company does not want to sign a binding agreement that
would prevent the expulsion of small-scale gold miners at some later date. During the
negotiations, local government officials played a mediating role, but did not actively
intervene in the wording of the agreement, which now functions as an informal local
law. Through this agreement the government and the company tolerate the activi-
ties of Nieuw Koffiekamp gold miners on certain lands around their village without
legitimising them and recognising their customary land rights.
In their negotiations with the government and the mining multinational, the
Makamboa gold miners have formed their own semi-autonomous social field. They
recreate customary tribal law to claim the rights to the mining grounds, but blend the
Maroon rules with additions based on the legitimation they receive from the nego-
tiations with the company and state representatives. The group has developed and
enforces its own rules regarding who are and who are not “Koffiekamp miners,''
the obligations of miners, and sanctions for those who do not comply. One of these
obligations suggests that associated miners who work within the Rosebel Gold Mine
exploitation concession have to pay a percentage of their earnings to Makamboa.
Makamboa, in turn, hands this money to the Nieuw Koffiekamp women's organisa-
tion, which deposits it in a bank in the capital city. The communitymembers collectively
determine the money's final destination. Thus far, the miners' “taxes'' have contributed
to the extension of the elementary school, and the construction of a clinic, government
offices, a recreation centre and a modern air-conditioned meeting hall for the village.
A pressing new problem is that, with the current exorbitant price of gold, the com-
pany may assert its legal right to exploit gold deposits near and underneath the village.
The mining multinational is already moving closer to the village of Nieuw Koffiekamp
than was previously foreseen. Dynamite blasting is disturbing the community members
and producing cracks in the cement walls of the school and houses. If the situation
worsens, villagers may have to leave.
The developments of the past two decades demonstrate that, when confronted
with invaders of their homelands, the Nieuw Koffiekamp community members have
enhanced their skills to engage with different legal systems. They engage with the avail-
able legal systems and recombine them for their own purposes and in their own way.
Nieuw Koffiekamp inhabitants base their right to mine for gold on their tribal status
and the related customary law system. Despite their strengthened position vis-à-vis the
mining multinational, the Nieuw Koffiekamp community and its gold miners remain
vulnerable. Due to the fact that customary tribal laws have no national legal backing
and because most arrangements with the company are based on oral agreement, the
community continues to risk losing its homelands.