Ethics, Scientists, Engineers and the Military - Ethical Engineering for International Development and Environmental Sustainability - page 343

Science and Technology Labs and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council, namely, defence technology centres (Parkinson 2012a ). Researchers who
are willing to accept joint MoD funding probably have a greater chance of obtaining
funding than those who are not, since this reduces the amount required from the
research councils. Thus, the joint funding schemes may have the unintended effect
of reducing the funding available for civilian research projects.
Military-university consortia involved in joint grant schemes and research cen-
tres have included (1) 'towers of excellence' in guided weapons, radar, underwater
sensors and electronic warfare; (2) defence and aerospace research partnerships;
(3) defence technology centres in data and information fusion, electromagnetic
remote sensing and systems engineering for autonomous systems and robotics;
(4) and the counterterrorism science and technology centre (Langley et al. 2007 ).
However, towers of excellence and defence and aerospace research partnerships
have apparently been discontinued (Parkinson 2012a ). Ten UK universities have
been involved in research on robotic aircraft or drones as part of the FLAVIIR pro-
gramme, and BAE Systems is developing two armed drones. They were originally
used in reconnaissance, but since 2007 the UK has used them in Afghanistan and
had carried out 200 drone strikes by the end of 2011 (Parkinson 2012b ).
UK universities tend to justify military funding on the grounds that it is only a
small percentage of total funding, contributes to national security and the research
also has 'spin-off' civilian applications. However, military funding may form a large
part of the support of particular engineering and computer science departments
and therefore shape their research priorities (Parkinson 2012a ). UK military
equipment is often exported to governments with poor human rights records and
used in the suppression of protests, e.g. in Libya, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
(HCC 2011 ). This is likely to reduce rather than increase security, both in the UK
and globally.
Civilian benefi ts from military research have generally been disappointing,
particularly when the very higher levels of investment are considered (Langley et al.
2005 ). This is probably to be expected, since military and civilian needs are very
different, and directly targeting resources at the civilian applications of interest
would seem a much more effective approach than hoping they will emerge as a
result of military work or making them one potential outcome of joint work. Thus,
for instance, the development of more accurate precision targeting systems for
depleted uranium weapons seems unlikely to result in a cure for the common cold
or a bicycle wheel that cannot be punctured. The systemic shortcoming of the
military-industrial sector makes it questionable that military R&D has any net
economic benefi ts (Dunne and Coulomb 2008 ). Military R&D diverts resources and
expertise from civilian projects, thereby reducing the likelihood of advances in
desired directions. The greater openness and fl exibility of civilian research projects
generally also make them more effective in producing innovation (Parkinson et al.
2013 ). In addition, costly downstream technical efforts and additional resources are
generally required to develop a viable commercial product from military R&D. When
spin-offs do occur, this raises ethical issues of the diversion of government funds to
private fi rms (Alic et al. 1992 ).