Ethics, Scientists, Engineers and the Military - Ethical Engineering for International Development and Environmental Sustainability - page 337

War, Iraq was transformed almost overnight from an ally to which the west had sold
a wide range of military equipment into an enemy. The USA provided Afghanistani
mujahideen with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles in the 1980s for use against the Soviet
military. When the USA subsequently invaded in 2001, some of these missiles were
in the hands of the Taliban (CAAT 2010 ).
At one time, majority world countries were totally dependent on imported major
weapons systems with associated high costs, a reduction in the ability to make inde-
pendent 'defence' decisions and political constraints. However, a number of these
countries, such as China, Israel, South Korea, South Africa and Taiwan, are now
developing their own weapons systems (Jan and Jan 2000 ) and in some cases also
exporting them. Having their own arms production capabilities protects smaller
countries from arms embargoes and dependence on imports and associated political
constraints (Jackson 2011 ). Military R&D is complicated and expensive and
requires scientists and engineers (Jan and Jan 2000 ), and this can divert them from
important civilian areas. The establishment of military R&D capacity in minority
world countries draws on and further ingrains the focus on national security based
on well-armed military forces (Jackson 2011 ) rather than peace building and solving
underlying problems. India was the largest recipient of arms in 2008-2012 followed
by China (Holtom et al. 2013 ). Arms imports by states in Western and Central
Europe have decreased signifi cantly due to reduced military spending and increasing
economic uncertainty, with domestic arms producers preferred (Holtom 2013 ).
Since the Arms Trade Treaty, which is anyway weak, has only very recently
come into force (Holtom and Bromley 2013a ), other than a number of arms embar-
goes and restrictions resulting from international agreements, such as the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, there has been little regulation of the arms trade. Therefore,
the majority of arms sales, including to confl ict areas or countries with serious
human rights abuses, have been legal. Arms sales can facilitate human rights
abuses by direct use of the arms, indicating international approval and thereby
lending legitimacy and prestige (Williamson 1990 ) to governments which practice
internal repression and torture and increasing the military capacity of governments.
For instance, Syria modernised its forces prior to 2011 with imports of conventional
weapons increasing by 330% between 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 (Wezeman 2013 ).
There have been international differences in response to the confl ict in Syria, with
the EU, Turkey and USA maintaining arms embargoes, calling for a UN embargo
and trying to prevent the delivery of arms by other states when legally possible and
Iran, Russia and the Ukraine continuing to supply arms to the Syrian government
(Wezeman 2013 ). Opposition and 'rebel' groups have largely used arms captured
from Syrian forces. The USA has provided communications and other equipment
and the UK communications equipment and body armour to the 'rebels'. It is diffi -
cult to measure the volume of foreign military 'aid' to the 'rebels', and no state has
admitted directly to supplying them, though there are reports of states either supply-
ing them directly or providing funds to obtain weapons on the black market
(Wezeman 2013 ). The UK government approved arms export licences in 2010 to 16
of the 26 'countries of concern' (CAAT 2011 ) on that year's human rights report
(UK 2011 ). UK arms have been used in the suppression of protests in Bahrain and