Vanities of the Bonfire - Pushing the Limits: New Adventures in Engineering - page 125

cording to Bowen, all those who might have had a responsible role in Bonfire 2002 inquired about
protection from legal liability. The only way to achieve this was through enormously expensive in-
surance, and this cost coupled with that of building a redesigned Bonfire—estimated to be in the
range of $1 million to $1.5 million—was criticized as excessive, given budget problems faced by
the institution. In conjunction with the safety and liability issues, the cost was judged prohibitive.
Anticipating questions about resuming Bonfire in 2003, Bowen noted that he would be stepping
down as president well before that decision would have to be made. He stated that he was not doing
anything to “take away options for the future.” Supporters of Bonfire found venues off campus in
attempts to continue the tradition but with no assurance of safety.
If the Texas A&M Bonfire had not collapsed in 1999 and instead had been allowed to continue
in the laissez-faire manner of the 1990s, some future bonfire likely would have led to a tragedy that
demanded a reassessment of the practice. The virtually unregulated evolution of the design of such
a massive structure was a prescription for disaster. It is human nature to build on past successes
with a bravado, of which students especially have a great deal, that so often can be checked only by
tragedy. Had anyone pointed out before the fact the dangers of the individual acts of abandon iden-
tified afterward, they no doubt would have been scoffed at, for Bonfire had been such a successful
and revered tradition. Unfortunately, it was a tradition carried forward without conservatism. In that
regard, the 1999 Bonfire collapse repeated the pattern of a great number of other colossal failures
that have plagued amateur and professional builders alike throughout history.