Partnerships, platforms and power - Water Scarcity, Livelihoods and Food Security - page 172

research institutions, they simultaneously pursued scholarly publications by
including them as outputs in their project proposals.
If outcomes are truly sought, one approach would be to build incentives
into partnership contracts. A small but important step would be to make final
payment contingent on distribution of outputs to boundary partners. For
example, a CPWF Mekong Phase 1 project produced a Guidance Manual on
Agroecosystems Assessment in Cambodia . It was launched by an inexpensive
communications campaign that distributed 430 of the 500 printed copies to
63 individuals and institutions in 15 countries within three months. It did not
produce big outcomes in terms of changes to government policy or new
university curricula. But the chances of big outcomes are much increased with
the small outcome of distributing the pamphlet.
In the Limpopo Basin a group of key partners and strategic stakeholders
participated in a “science roll out” meeting with Limpopo BDC researchers.
Participants shared and discussed outputs (decision-support tools, interactive
databases on small reservoirs, rehabilitation guidelines, etc.). The event set the
stage for deeper communication and collaboration between research partners
and implementing agencies around specific outputs. It will continue beyond
the lifetime of the CPWF. The process of getting from outputs to outcomes
was facilitated through existing networks and partnerships, which had been
nurtured from the beginning of Phase 2 of CPWF.
Organizational incentives
Organizations also have incentives, which ultimately boil down to funding,
which in turn is dependent on how donors perceive the relevance, credibility
and salience of the organization (see Chapter 6). This is why the CGIAR
started the Global Challenge Programs, “to change the way [it did] business.”
But the Challenge Programs created an immediate paradox for their host
Centers. If the challenge programs were allowed too much independence—
over what direction they took, who they engaged with and what aims they
pursued—the host Center still remained legally responsible for those actions.
To reduce risk, Center Boards demanded tight central control over Challenge
Program activities. (See Chapter 4 for more detail.)
For others attempting change, we suggest that changing the incentives for
individual researchers could be a lever for institutional change. Willingness to
make even small changes in the incentive structure could signal commitment
to change. But it needs to be installed at the very beginning of the change
process. Early in the formulation of the CRPs, Woolley and colleagues offered
a critical analysis of management and financial arrangements that provided
good guidelines (Woolley et al., 2009).